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ABSTRACT 
 
 Statistical discrimination is frequently applied to illustrate different economic 
opportunities among equally able individuals. We use statistics from 1994, the second 
wave of the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, to analyze the income received from 
paid work jobs as the measure of an individual’s economic opportunity. At the same time, 
Heckman’s two-stage procedure is performed to account for possible bias that arises from 
estimating with only a pool of paid workers. We are interested in testing the following 
hypotheses: whether employers statistically discriminate among potential workers on the 
basis of education and immigration status if they have limited information about those 
workers and whether they learn to revise their judgments as new information is obtained. 
 The results confirm the employer learning and statistical discrimination based on 
years of schooling hypotheses for the Canadian labour market. The labour market returns 
to initially unobservable characteristic increases with time spend in the labour market. In 
addition, wage becomes less related to education that employers initially use to infer an 
individual’s productivity. On the other hand, immigration status is not very informative 
about the productivity of a worker and the results do not support the hypothesis of 
statistical discrimination on the basis of immigration status. This paper points out the 
challenges faced by traditional labour market policies in a world of statistical 
discrimination and employer learning. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As human beings, it is often the case that we must make many and sometimes 
significant decisions on the basis of limited information. Examples might range from 
whether or not to purchase a used car, to get on an airplane, to become involved in a 
relationship, or to invest in financial markets. The scenarios described above are not 
uncommon. They demonstrate the problem of uncertainty and asymmetric market 
information in reality. Market agents realize this, but they nevertheless make judgements 
with every piece of available information. Further, learning new information will induce 
agents to re-evaluate initial assessments. 
Statistical discrimination results from individuals’ rational reactions to imperfect 
information. When presented with incomplete information, people attach estimates on the 
basis of statistical evidence. In labour economics, the true productivity of job applicants is 
not directly observable. As a result, given that the process of information acquisition on 
productivity can incur substantial costs, managers may categorize applicants according to 
the typical characteristics of the type (such as gender or ethnic group) to which applicants 
belong. In other words, group averages are applied to individuals. Unfortunately, however, 
statistical information may be misleading when an individual is an exception to the type. 
Yet employers can learn or update their beliefs in various ways. During the hiring 
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process, they are able to learn about potential employees’ backgrounds and characteristics 
through documents including school reports, criminal reports, resumes, and also through 
job interviews. Once a worker is hired, information about his or her performance can be 
generated and collected in the form of job surveillance. Learning is therefore an essential 
process in order for employers to gather and improve their knowledge of their workers.  
The relationship between education and wage is often explained within the traditional 
human capital model. The model suggests two implications. First, that attending school 
enables individuals to acquire knowledge, which in turn makes them more able and/or 
more productive. Therefore, the second implication is that better-educated people receive 
higher wages. However, an alternative called the “signaling model” has been proposed in 
information economics. This model suggests that education alone is not a mechanism for 
productivity enhancing but rather only provides information that signals ability. That is, if 
it is believed that more years of schooling indicates increased motivation (or other positive 
attributes) and that motivation affects job performance, then cost-minimizing firms have 
incentive to statistically discriminate among workers on the basis of education because it 
can signal worker productivity and is information usually free for employers to use. 
Nevertheless, once new information becomes available in the market, the impact of 
education on pay decision should decrease. 
 Canada is well-known for its open immigration policy. Immigration not only plays an 
important role in the Canadian economy, but also creates a lot of policy debate. According 
to studies done by Immigration Canada (2003), 229,091 immigrants entered Canada in 
2002. Without doubt, the impact on society when immigrants start to participate in the 
labour force is one of the most interesting policy questions. Over the past two decades, 
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there have been many studies regarding immigrants’ earning opportunities in Canada. 
Many empirical results show that since 1970 recent immigrants are mostly from Third 
World countries and appear to suffer high levels of economic penalties upon entry 
(Chiswick and Miller 2000; De Silva 1992). Oftentimes, the reasons given for immigrants’ 
lower wages include factors, such as low proficiency in the destination language or a lack 
of country-specified labour market skills. 
 This paper is motivated primarily by the study on testing statistical discrimination and 
employer learning done by Altonji and Pierret (1998, 2001). The argument for conducting 
the test was to point out that, contrary to many previous empirical studies, employees might 
not be the source of causing earning inequality. The researchers first suggest that initial 
wages are indeed determined by early signals such as education. As learning by employers 
takes place, wages should become more dependent on new information which is not 
available to employers at the beginning of workers’ careers and become less reliant on the 
limited information presented at the time of hire. Does this same situation exist in Canada? 
This is what we aim to find out. This paper intends to analyze the role of employees’ 
education in firms’ pay decisions. Furthermore, we would also like to investigate whether 
immigration status is used as a cheap informational source to determine wage, since most 
immigrants are from the less developing countries and employers may lack the knowledge 
necessary to evaluate their abilities. 
The two main objectives of this study are: 
? To identify the effects of education on wages. With a rich data set, this study tries to 
answer the questions: Do employers statistically discriminate on the basis of 
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education in Canada? Also, can we find any evidence regarding employer learning in 
Canada? 
? To test whether employers statistically discriminate among workers on the basis of 
immigration status. 
 This paper utilizes a Canadian data set: the second wave of Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics (SLID) – 1994 Public Use Micro Data Report, which provides both 
person specific and job information. We exclude self-employed individuals because we for 
the purposes of this study are interested only in market opportunities of paid workers. Since 
paid workers are not a random sample of the overall population, sample selection bias is a 
potential problem. An attempt has been made in this study to correct this bias. 
 The results support the hypotheses for employer learning and statistical 
discrimination based on years of schooling in Canada. The labour market returns to 
initially unobservable characteristic increases with time spend in the labour market. In 
addition, wage becomes less related to education that employers initially use to infer an 
individual’s productivity. On the other hand, immigration status is not very informative 
about the productivity of a worker and the results do not support the hypothesis of 
statistical discrimination on the basis of immigration status.   
The organization of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the literature on 
statistical theory of discrimination and related empirical results in different countries. 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background on testing statistical discrimination and 
employer learning. The standard Mincerian wage function is applied here. Chapter 4 
discusses the data source, variable groupings, and estimation technique. Chapter 5 
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addresses the regression results and the contribution that each factor makes. A summary of 
the findings and some possible directions for future research will be presented in the final 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  Although there exists a significant amount of research regarding why wage 
differences exist among equally productive individuals in the competitive labour market, 
no single theory claims to explain these differences thoroughly. According to the personal 
prejudice model (Becker 1971), employers have prejudicial opinions against certain groups 
of people. A result of these opinions is discriminatory treatments of equally able workers. 
However, Becker argued that, once the product market competition is at work, 
non-discriminating employers will drive discriminating employers out of the marketplace 
since firms that discriminate will need to forego profits in order to satisfy their prejudicial 
desires. While prejudice is one possible explanation for these differing treatments, our 
study here builds on the employer ignorance. This chapter discusses the idea of statistical 
discrimination and reviews the literature on the dynamic pattern of returns relative to 
education and experience within an employer learning model. 
 
2.1 Statistical Theory of Discrimination 
 Economists have proposed several types of labour market discrimination, which vary 
according to the sources of discrimination. One of the types that arose in the early 1970s is 
based on the statistical theory. This theory argues that scanty information about career 
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performance or attributes on job applications may lead rational employers to predict 
applicants’ abilities by attaching values to some non-relevant factors, such as gender and 
ethnic group. There are basically two strands in the statistical discrimination literature. 
Derived by Arrow (1973), the first strand suggests that incorrect stereotyping of ability 
may cause employers’ beliefs to be self-fulfilled. The most common example stemming 
from this strand is that individuals from certain groups will tend to have weak incentives to 
obtain human capital investments if they expect that employers think they are less qualified 
than other applicants. Therefore, these employees remain low in productivity, which 
reinforces employers’ prior beliefs. The second strand in the statistical discrimination 
literature is addressed by Phelps (1972). The idea is that the accuracy of the information of 
productivity differs across groups, which in turn causes wage differentials even if the 
average natural ability is the same for all groups. 
  
2.2 The Quality of Productivity Information Perceived by Employers  
- Phelps (1972) 
In his empirical paper, Phelps (1972) suggests that with a test score, an employer is 
able to measure an applicant’s productivity. Additionally, he brings up the importance of 
“skin color” in employers’ pay decisions. In other words, both the test score of an 
individual and the physical characteristics of the racial groups that s/he belongs to are 
observed by employers and are used to assess the performance. 
 Two cases are considered by Phelps (1972). In the first case, blacks are said to be less 
productive than whites on average. Then, one might expect to find blacks be offered lower 
wages even if blacks and whites have the same test score. Described by Phelps (1972), the 
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wage curve relating to the test score for blacks should lie below and parallel to that for 
whites as shown in Figure 2.1. 
In the second case, the reliability of the test scores is allowed to vary between racial 
groups. Phelps (1972) argued that less reliable test score for blacks would lead to a 
situation where high-ability blacks could earn less than high-ability whites. This is because 
less accurate information about blacks causes employers to assess higher measurement 
error when estimating productivity. 
 
        W                                                      Whites 
                                                Ww                                                Blacks 
                                                WB                         
                                                     
                                                                        45◦
                                                        0                     α             Test Scores 
Figure 2.1: Wage curve with Test score and Race. Based on Phelps (1972, Figure 1). 
 
- Aigner and Cain (1977) 
  Aigner and Cain (1977) take a slightly different approach from that of Phelps’s 
statistical discrimination model. In their opinion, Phelps’s model does not convincingly 
describe statistical discrimination because it assumes a difference in average productivity 
between whites and blacks in the first case. Theoretically, the labour market discrimination 
is defined as different pay for equally productive workers. Moreover, both groups with the 
same average test scores receive the same average wages, as at Point A in figure 2.2. 
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Instead, their assumptions are as follows:  
1. Workers’ pre-labour market investments and endowments are given.  
2. The test scores of black people (or of women) have more variability.  
3. And more importantly, employers are risk-averse.  
Assumption 3. states that rational employers will attempt to maximize the expected 
actual performance discount the risk, while assumption 2. simply implies that the risk 
factors for blacks or women are larger than those for whites or men.  
As indicated in Figure 2.2, the slope is flatter for blacks because the test scores of 
blacks are not heavily weighted compared to those of whites. Therefore, for equally 
productive whites and blacks, having a larger risk value ascribes the lower wage for black.    
 In general, Aigner and Cain’s results confirm that minority group workers with the 
same test scores as those of dominant group workers are on average rewarded with unequal 
wages or earnings. However, they also mention that their empirical results should be read 
with caution because the analysis deals only with statistical discrimination within a 
competitive market.  
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Figure 2.2: Wage curve with Test score and Race with risk discounted. Based on 
Aigner and Cain (1977, Figure 2). 
 
 - Lundberg and Startz (1983) 
 While Aigner and Cain (1977) take the worker’s pre-labour market investments and 
endowments as exogenous, the study conducted by Lundberg and Startz (1983) emphasizes 
the presence of statistical discrimination will affect individuals’ human capital investment 
decisions. According to their study, the competitive labour market includes the following 
agents: 
1. Profit-maximizing firms: can identify each worker as either white or black and 
pay a wage equal to the expected value of the worker’s marginal product. 
2. Utility-maximizing individuals: take the known wage schedules into 
consideration while making the human capital investments. 
They assume that a worker’s productivity can be determined by his or her innate and 
acquired characteristics. The worker has a perfect knowledge of his or her own 
characteristics and will acquire human capital until the marginal cost equals the marginal 
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benefit of doing so. 
In a situation where the information quality for whites is higher than that for blacks, 
the Lundberg and Startz model again shows that members of the latter group will receive 
lower reward for their investments in skills prior to labour market entry because employers 
have more difficulty observing their capabilities. Thereby, this would diminish future 
blacks’ incentives to acquire human capital. 
 
- Feltovich and Papageorgiou (2004) 
 Unlike the aforementioned studies, Feltovich and Papageorgiou (2004) actually 
develop simple experiments that study statistical discrimination by examining the 
decision-making problems faced by employers. 
 Two experiments were carried out at two universities comprising 36 participants in 
total. Each experiment consisted of 9 rounds. Participants in each round were presented 
with 2 buckets. Each bucket contained 50 cards and each card represented one individual. 
That is, individuals who share some observable characteristics were identified as one group 
and were put together into one bucket. The participants were allowed to draw 4 cards with 
subsequent replacement from the 2 buckets. A number representing the true marginal 
productivity of the worker was printed on the card. Intuitively, the average productivity of a 
particular group was just the mean of the numbers in a bucket. However, drawing cards 
also incurred costs. It was the most costly to draw all 4 cards from one bucket. Therefore, a 
participant’s profit was just the sum of numbers on the four cards drawn minus the total 
cost. 
There were three distributions of cards: High, Medium, and Low. For the first six 
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rounds, Bucket One contained a High distribution and Bucket Two contained a Low 
distribution. Most importantly, both buckets contained Median distribution in rounds 7 to 9. 
Therefore, the researchers’ main hypotheses were: 
1. The behavior of participants would tend to move gradually toward the optimal 
behavior. 
2. The results of the first six rounds should have an incorrect impact on participants’ 
beliefs for the last three rounds. That is, better experience with Bucket One 
would provide participants incentives to continually choose Bucket One more 
often than Bucket Two, even when there is no longer a distribution difference 
between them. 
 Since participants did not know the actual distributions, the results confirm that they 
learned over time. The main findings are as follows: 
1. The results are significantly consistent with the first hypothesis. In other words, 
when workers’ observable characteristics are informative of their productivity, 
the demands of more able workers will increase (Bucket One). 
2. However, there is only weak evidence supporting hypothesis 2. When workers’ 
observable characteristics are not informative; the demands of both types of 
workers are approximately the same. 
 
2.3 The Dynamic Patterns of Returns to Education and Experience within the 
Employer Learning Model 
 With regard to the literature on testing the employer learning phenomenon, the most 
representative work has been done by Farber and Gibbons (1996), as well as by Altonji and 
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Pierret (1998, 2001). Farber and Gibbons investigate a learning model using level of 
earnings. Altonji and Pierre, on the other hand, study a learning model that employs the 
logarithm of earnings, and further develop a system to test the statistical discrimination in 
their model.  
 
2.3.1 United States: 
- Farber and Gibbons (1996) 
 Farber and Gibbons (1996) estimate a wage level equation given that the market is 
public and that the learning process for all employers occurs at the same rate. The data in 
their study are derived from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They 
consider two types of variables that affect productivity. The first type of variable (s) is 
schooling, a variable that both firms and researchers can observe directly. The second type 
of variable (z) is used as a proxy for workers’ unobserved characteristics: AFQT test scores 
and possession of a library card at age fourteen, a variable that can only be accessed by 
researchers and is assumed to be uncorrelated with schooling. 
Firstly, Farber and Gibbons (1996) find that both education and experience have the 
usual positive relationship with wage. The estimated effect of education on the wage level 
is approximately 9%. However, there is no significant indication that the impact of 
education varies with labour market experience. Their interpretation for this result is that 
employers’ future observations, in general, verify the positive relationship between 
expected productivity and education for new labour market entrants. Secondly, the 
estimated coefficients on the interactions between test score and experience, as well as 
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between library card and experience, are statistically significantly and positive: 0.1848 
(0.06) and 0.6169 (0.192), respectively. This is consistent with the prediction of the 
learning model. The reason is that the initial unobserved information which is correlated 
with the ability of the workers will have an increasingly positive effect on wage as 
experience accumulates. 
 
- Altonji and Pierret (1998, 2001) 
While maintaining the public learning assumption in Farber and Gibbons’s (1996) 
study, Altonji and Pierret (1998, 2001) instead analyze a logarithm wage function to test 
employer learning and statistical discrimination. A crucial difference is that they allow s 
and z to be correlated with each other. Using the same NLSY data, s is measured by years 
of schooling, while the standardized AFQT test score, father’s education and the wage of 
siblings measure z.  
From Altonji and Pierret’s (1998, 2001) results, employers learn about productivity. 
The negative coefficient on education interacted with experience at –0.0032 (0.0094) 
indicates that wages become less dependent on education with experience. Moreover, the 
coefficients on AFQT and AFQT * experience at –0.0060 (0.0360) and 0.0752 (0.0286) 
imply that the effect of an individual’s unobserved ability will increase as time passes. 
They further present evidence on statistical discrimination on the basis of education. 
When AFQT * experience is added into the equation, the coefficient on education * 
experience becomes more negative. It drops significantly, from –0.0032 (0.0094) 
to –0.0234 (0.0123). 
On the other hand, they find that the results contradict the hypothesis of fully 
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statistical discrimination on the basis of race because the race gap rises sharply with 
experience. When the experience interactions of AFQT, father’s education, and the sibling 
wage are introduced, the race gap actually decreases, which provides further evidence 
regarding employer learning. Therefore, Altonji and Pierret (1998, 2001) conclude that as 
firms learn about productivity, wage will be determined by unobserved ability rather than 
by some easily observable characteristics. 
 
2.3.2 Canada 
- Heisz and Oreopoulos (2002) 
 Based on the U.S studies, Heisz and Oreopoulos (2002) investigated the effects of 
school rank, father’s wage, and brother’s wage on an MBA graduate’s earning and a 
lawyer’s earning separately, combining four data sets (T1 Family File, University Student 
Information System, Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program Database, and School 
Ranking Data). In addition, they extended the basic model to explain the firms’ job 
placements and promotion decisions. 
 For both groups, they find that individuals’ wages rise as school rank increases. Also, 
father’s wage and brother’s wage, which are correlated with new information about worker 
productivity, have a positive effect on an MBA graduate’s or a lawyer’s wage. However, 
they claim that their finding on the effect of school rank with experience is inconsistent 
with the employer learning and statistical discrimination model. That is, even though both 
coefficients on father’s wage and brother’s wage increase with experience, the school rank 
continuously has a statistically significant and positive effect on wage with experience. 
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2.3.3 Germany  
- Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) 
Using the German Socio-Economic Panel data, Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) 
tested the hypotheses of employer learning for Germany. Since the data set contains no test 
score information, they used parental education as the indicator of an individual’s innate 
ability. In fact, they conclude that there seems to be no employer learning evidence in 
Germany. The interaction between parental education and experience is only marginally 
significant and has a positive effect on wage at 0.045 (1.80), which behaves as the prior 
expectation. However, the most troublesome result is that the estimated coefficient on 
education interacted with experience is also positive and statistically significant at 0.095 
(4.11). 
 
2.3.4 Ghana 
- Strobl (2003) 
Strobl (2003) applied the employer learning model to study whether education is used 
as a signaling device for productivity in Ghana. His data source is from the Regional 
Programme for Enterprise Development (RPED) data for year 1998 for Ghana. He also 
points out the importance of distinguishing between different hiring channels. Two types of 
hiring channels are considered in the paper. The first type is that workers are hired through 
employers’ or existing employees’ relatives or friends, while the second type focuses on the 
hiring of workers who have no connection to the firm. Intuitively, employers have more 
information about the job applicants in the first case. In the study, years of schooling is 
treated as the easily observable variable and the maximum years of parents’ schooling is 
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used as the proxy for ability. 
In general, the results for both hiring channels are similar to each other. The results 
reveal that education has a positive and significant role in explaining wages. On the other 
hand, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term of education and experience is 
statistically insignificant positive for the first type of hiring channel while it is statistically 
insignificant negative for workers who have no direct contact with firms. Furthermore, the 
interaction terms of parents’ schooling and experience are shown to be positive, although 
not statistically significant. Hence, Strobl (2003) concludes that employers in Ghana do not 
learn workers’ productivity over time and education is not used as a signal device in Ghana. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 Theoretically, all studies suggest that members in a group with a noisier productivity 
indicator would receive lower wages even if two groups of people have the same average 
level of ability. Feltovich and Papageorgiou’s (2004) experiments further indicate that the 
demands of workers from both groups are approximately the same when the productivity 
indicators are not very informative. 
Table 2.1: Summary of Literature on the Employer Learning Model 
Returns to Variable FG 
(1996) 
AP 
(1998,2001)
HP 
(2002) 
BH 
(2001) 
Strobl 
(2002) 
Easily observable (S) (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* 
Difficult-to-observe (Z) (+)* (-) (+)* (-) (-) 
S * Experience (-) (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) and (-) 
Z * Experience (+)* (+)* (+)* (+) (+) 
* represents statistically significant results at 95% of confidence interval 
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Moreover, most empirical studies focusing on employer learning show that 
hard-to-observe characteristics play more important roles in situations where firms spend 
more time with employees. Evidence also suggests that employers tend to use easily 
observable characteristics to predict workers’ productivity at the time of hire. We 
summarize the literature on the employer learning model in Table 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 This chapter presents the basic theory of wage determination, which has been 
employed in many empirical studies to explain inequalities or differences in wage levels 
among individuals. The propositions used to test statistical discrimination and employer 
learning are examined in the latter section.  
 
3.1 Specification for Wage Equation 
To explain whether readily available information serves as an ideal trait for an 
employer to predict or infer a labour market entrant’s productivity when facing information 
uncertainty, we follow Altonji and Pierret’s (1998, 2001) [hereinafter AP] approach. In 
their study, the model departs from the standard Mincerian wage equation that we will 
discuss first, followed by the propositions stated by AP. 
 
3.1.1 Human Capital Theory 
 As proposed by Mincer (1974), human capital theory states the relationship between 
human capital investments and earnings. For utility-maximizing individuals, investments 
will be made only when the present value of future benefits equals or exceeds the present 
value of costs. In Mincer’s study, both education and experience are essential factors in the 
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analysis of individuals’ lifetime earnings. To obtain the effects of schooling on wages, let 
Wp be the wage that one is going to receive with (p) years of education, and (r) be the 
rate of return of education to earning 
A person’s wage is equal to W0 when his or her year of education is zero. If the person 
acquires one year of education, the wage function becomes 
W1 = W0 (1+r)            
Similarly, for a second year of education investment, an individual will earn 
W2 = W1 (1+r) = W0 (1+r)(1+r) = W0 (1+r)2     
Following the same logic, the wages one can earn after (p) years of investment in education 
are indicated by 
Wp = W0 (1+r) (1+r)…. (1+r) = W0 (1+r)p            
Taking logarithms on both sides and assuming (r) is a small value, the wage function of a 
person with (p) years of education is given as below: 
Ln Wp = Ln( W0 (1+r) p) = Ln W0 + p ln (1+r)     
        = Ln W0 + rp                                         (3.1) 
In addition to education, experience is also an important factor that affects an 
individual’s productivity and earning. Mincer (1974) uses age as a proxy for experience 
and demonstrates that wage compensation will increase as an individual ages through 
having more labour market experience. However, he also mentions that higher 
compensation reaches its maximum value at a certain age. That is, earnings should increase 
with age at a decreasing rate in an age-earning profile. The standard age-earning profile is 
shown in Figure 3.1. The concavity of the earning curve implies that a worker’s human 
capital starts to depreciate after the peak. 
 20
Earning 
 
 
 
                           Age 
Figure 3.1: Age-Earning Profile 
Adding the effects of experience to wage equation (3.1) and introducing a constant 
term α to present Ln W0, we have 
Ln W =  α + rp + β1t +β2t2                              (3.2) 
where t stands for labour market experience.  
 
3.1.2 Employer Learning and Wages 
AP simply extend the standard Mincer-type equation (3.2) to investigate the model of 
employer learning, providing that the labour market is competitive and the learning process 
for all firms occurs at the same rate. yt is denoted as the log of labour market productivity, 
accompanied by t years of work experience, and can be obtained as follows: 
  yt = rs + α1q + Λz + η + H(t)                (3.3) 
where  
▪ s are variables that can be directly observed by both the employer and the 
econometrician, such as years of schooling or race; 
▪        q represents other information that is relevant to an individual’s productivity 
and observable by the employer but not seen by the econometrician; 
▪ z measures a worker’s natural ability which can be observed only by the 
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econometrician, but not by the employer; 
▪ η consists other determinants of productivity and is not directly observed by 
the employers and the econometrician. In addition, it is scaled to have a unit 
coefficient; and 
▪ H(t) is the experience profile of a worker (can be first or higher orders of t) 
and is crucially assumed to be independent of s, z, q, or η (it fully captures 
the effects of on-the-job training). 
 Since z and η are not readily observable, profit-maximizing firms form conditional 
expectations E (z│s, q) and E (η│s, q), which are assumed to be linear in q and s. That is,  
  z = E (z│s, q) + v = γ1q + γ2s + v              (3.4) 
  η = E (η│s, q) + n = α2s + n               (3.5) 
where 
  E (v) = E (n) = 0 and are uncorrelated with s and q.1
Combining equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), we have 
yt = rs +H(t) + α1q + Λ(γ1q + γ2s + v) + (α2s+ n)   
      = (r +Λγ2 +α2)s + H(t) + (α1 +Λγ1) q + (Λv + n)              (3.6) 
Therefore, (Λv + n) is defined as the error in the employer’s belief about the logarithm 
of an individual’s productivity when s/he begins his/her career. AP further assume (Λv + n) 
to be independent of q and s. In each period (t) a noise signal of the log productivity 
becomes available, ξt = y + εt, where y = yt - H(t) and εt is independent of the other variables 
in the model. Hence, seeing ξ is equivalent to seeing dt = ξt - E (y│s,q) since employers 
know s and q. Additionally, the vector Dt = {d1, d2,.…,dt} is introduced, which summarizes 
                                                 
1 The mean of η does not depend on q in (3.5), since AP define the coefficient vector α1 on q in (3.3). 
Moreover, they allow s, z and η to be related to each other. 
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a worker’s performance history. Taken together, all employers’ information set consists of 
q, s and Dt. 
AP define µt as the difference between Λv + n and E (Λv + n │Dt); µt is uncorrelated 
with q, s and Dt and is distributed independent of q, s and Dt. We therefore have 
µt = (Λv + n) - E (Λv + n│Dt)               (3.7) 
Consequently, in a competitive market where all information is common to all 
employers, the wage of an individual is given by 
Wt = E (Yt│s, q, Dt) * eζt                (3.8) 
where  
Wt is the product of (i) the expected value of productivity Yt (Yt = exp(yt)) and (ii) the 
error component exp(ζt) that represents the measurement error and firm-specific 
factors that are not in the model and are not related to s, z and q. 
Equations (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8) imply that 
Wt = E (Yt│s, q, Dt) * eζt  
   = e (r + α2+Λγ2) s + (α1 + Λγ1) q e H(t) eE (Λv + n│Dt) E(eµt) eζt         (3.9) 
Taking logarithms into account, equation (3.9) becomes 
Log (Wt) = (r + Λγ2 + α2)s + H(t) + log(E(eµt)) + (Λγ1 + α1)q  
  + E(Λv + n│Dt) +ζt
Let wt = Log (Wt) and H*(t) = H(t) + log(E(eµt)), the log wage is equal to 
wt = (r + Λγ2 + α2)s + H*(t) + (Λγ1 + α1)q + E(Λv + n│Dt) +ζt
            (3.10) 
From (3.10), AP point out that wages change with experience because of two effects. 
The direct effect is due to productivity changes with experience. The indirect effect is 
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captured through E (Λv + n│Dt). Employers will adjust wage compensation when they 
find out the error in initial assessment of employees’ productivity. 
 
3.2 Strategy for Testing Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination 
 Although information q is not observed and/or not used by econometricians, by 
definition it is related to information s and z. Hence, AP introduce Φqs and Φqz which 
represent the coefficients of the auxiliary regression of (α1 + Λγ1 )q on s and z: 
Φqs = δ[(α1 + Λγ1 )q] /δs and   Φqz = δ[(α1 + Λγ1 )q] /δz 
In addition, Φst and Φzt are the coefficients that are obtained by regressing E(Λv + 
n│Dt) on s and z. These coefficients simply capture the effects of s and z as employers 
learn about the errors in initial assessment of workers’ productivity.   
AP consider the following conditional expectation equation when t=0…T where bst 
and bzt are the coefficients of s and z: 
  E (wt│s, z, t)= bsts + bztz + H*(t)                   (3.11) 
Since there is no performance history at the beginning of a career, E(Λv + n│D0) = 0. And 
(3.11) is simply 
  E (w0│s, z, 0)= bs0s + bz0z + H*(0)                        (3.12) 
Based on equation (3.10), the bias least square regression which omits variable q implies 
that 
bst = bs0 + Φst = [ ( r + Λγ2 + α2 ) +Φqs ] +Φst                      (3.13) 
bzt = bz0 + Φzt =Φqz +Φzt
Here the coefficients bs0 and bz0 therefore include part of the effects of q that is used by 
employers to figure out productivity. In addition, AP use the facts that cov(s, E(Λv + n│Dt)) 
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= 0 and cov(z, E(Λv + n│Dt)) = cov(v, E(Λv + n│Dt)). The coefficient matrix is, 
 
bst     =    bs0      + 1/│var(s,z)│*      var (z)  -cov(s,z)        0 
bzt     =    bz0                                                   -cov(s,z)   var(s)            cov(v, E(Λv + n│Dt) 
                           (3.14) 
Equation (3.14) can also be rewritten as 
 
bst =     bs0   + 1/│var(s,z)│*       var (z)   -cov(s,z)        θt           0 
bzt =     bz0                                                       -cov(s,z)   var(s)                Λvar(v)+ cov(v,n)  
                             (3.15) 
or         
  bst = bs0 + θtΦs                         (3.16) 
bzt = bz0 + θtΦz           
where 
 Φs and Φz are the coefficients of regression of Λv + n on s and z 
θt summerizes how much the employers know about Λv + n at time t and equal to 
cov(z, E(Λv + n│Dt)) / cov(z, Λv + n)  
= cov(v, E(Λv + n│Dt)) / cov(v, Λv + n) 
In period 0, θt is 0 since firms know nothing about Λv + n at this time. When it is 1, firms 
have learned what Λv + n is and therefore know the productivity yt. From equation (3.15), 
we are able to derive 
Φs= -cov(s,z) * [Λvar(v)+ cov(v,n) / │var(s,z) │] and 
  Φz = var(s) * [Λvar(v)+ cov(v,n) / │var(s,z) │]                  (3.17) 
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And it can also be shown that 
  Φs = -ΦzsΦz                                (3.18) 
where 
Φzs is the coefficient of the regression of z on s and is equal to cov(s,z) / var(s). 
Using equations (3.17) and (3.18), AP conclude three propositions to test employer 
learning and the statistical discrimination model. 
 
Proposition 1: When cov(v, Λv + n)>0 and cov(s, z)>0, Φs should be negative and Φz 
should be positive. Then, the estimated coefficient on bst (=bs0 + θtΦs) should be 
non-increasing in labour market experience. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient 
on bzt (= bz0 + θtΦz) is non-decreasing in labour market experience.  
A simple intuition for the decline in bst is stated by AP (page 321): 
As employers learn about the productivity of a worker, an observable variable (s) 
will get less of the credit for an association with productivity that arises because s is 
correlated with an initially unobservable variable (z), provided that z is included in the 
wage equation with a time-dependent coefficient and can claim the credit. 
 
Proposition 2: If employers have full information about the productivity of new employees 
or employers do not learn over time, then δbst / δt = δbzt / δt = 0. 
 
Proposition 3: Based on (3.18), one can test δbst / δt = - Φzs * δbzt / δt.  
One can see immediately that equation (3.18) is weighted by -Φzs. Therefore, the effect of 
learning on coefficient bst has two components. One comes from the relationship between s 
and z, which is captured byΦzs. The other is due to the fact that employers gradually learn 
about z. 
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3.3 Statistical Discrimination on the Basis of Schooling 
 While maintaining the crucial assumptions that the labour market is competitive and 
that the information is public across all firms in AP’s model, the first part of estimation 
focuses on the role of education in a wage function. That is, education (p) is used as an 
easily observable characteristic (s).  
We add experience and experience square into the estimation equation to capture the 
phenomenon of diminishing return to experience. The experience coefficient is expected to 
be positive and the experience square coefficient is expected to be negative. Empirical 
studies also suggest wage differentials among various occupations and industries. Both 
occupational and industrial categories are dummy explanatory variables. We include 
differing marital status, places of residence, and firm sizes as well. All of these variables 
are denoted by a row vector X.  
A total of 5 wage equations will be estimated in this section and the base line of our 
estimation function is 
 
(a) Ln W = βx X +βp p + υ                                                                     (3.19) 
where ν is the random error term and is assumed to be uncorrelated with other variables 
in the model. 
 
(b) The second step is adding a z variable into the estimation. 
Ln W = βx X +βp p +βz z + υ                     (3.20) 
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(c) Next, we drop the z variable and take schooling interacted with experience into account 
(p * t). 
Ln W = βx X +βp p +βpt (p * t) + υ                                            (3.21) 
 
(d) Both the z variable and the interaction term for schooling are added into the wage 
equation. 
Ln W = βx X +βp p +βz z + βpt (p* t) + υ                               (3.22) 
 
(e) Finally, we estimate an equation which includes the z variable and all interaction 
variables. 
  Ln W = βx X +βp p +βz z + βpt (p * t) +βzt (z * t)+ υ                           (3.23) 
 
 Our testable hypotheses are as follows. First, βzt is non-decreasing and βpt is 
non-increasing. Second, that employers have full information about the new workers’ 
productivity implies βpt = βzt = 0. Third, if an employer statistically discriminates on the 
basis of education, the negative coefficient of the regression of z on schooling (p) 
multiplied by βzt should equal to βpt. 
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3.4 Statistical Discrimination on the Basis of Immigration Status 
 In order to investigate whether firms statistically discriminate on the basis of 
immigration status (I), it is treated as a second observable variable (s) in the second part of 
estimation 
In addition to those control variables discussed in the previous section, we also 
include years since migration and years since migration square as additional explanatory 
variables into vector X. Moreover, we specifically distinguish the experience into 
Canadian labour market experience (tc) and non-Canadian labour market experience (tnc). 
Therefore, the base estimate equation in this part is: 
 
(a) Ln W = βx X +β pp + βI I + υ                         (3.24) 
where ν is the random error term and is assumed to be uncorrelated with other variables 
in the model. 
 
(b) z variable is added into the model.  
Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I + βz z + υ                               (3.25)  
 
(c) z variable is excluded and schooling interacted with labour market experience in 
Canada is added.  
Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I + βpt (p* tc) + υ                     (3.26) 
 
(d) Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I + βz z +βpt (p * tc) + υ                 (3.27) 
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(e) We add z, its interaction with Canadian experience and the interaction between 
schooling and Canadian experience, into the equation. 
Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I + βz z +βpt (p * tc) +βzt (z * tc) + υ                       (3.28) 
 
(f) (z * tc) is dropped and immigrant * Canadian experience (I * tc) is added. 
Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I +βz z + βpt (p* tc) +βIt ( I * tc) + υ                    (3.29) 
 
(g) Finally, we include z variable * Canadian experience in the model. 
Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I + βz z +βpt (p * tc) + βIt ( I * tc) + βzt (z * tc) + υ  
                                  (3.30) 
 
Hypothesis One is that if employers statistically discriminate on the basis of 
immigration status, adding (z * tc) into the model should make immigrant intercept (βI) 
more negative but make βIt less negative. This would suggest that if immigration status is 
used as a negative signaling device for productivity at the beginning of the career, it should 
become less important as new information is revealed to employers over time. Hypothesis 
Two: The product of the negative coefficient of z on p and βzt will equal βpt. In addition, the 
product of the negative coefficient of z on I and βzt will equal βIt.
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA, VARIABLE GROUPINGS, 
AND  
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
 
 To estimate equations (3.19) through (3.30) and test the propositions as discussed in 
chapter 3, this study utilizes a data set provided by Statistics Canada. This chapter 
discusses the detailed data source and variable groupings. The estimation technique will be 
presented in the final part of the chapter. 
 
4.1 Data Source 
 In the analysis, we employ the second wave of the Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics (SLID) – 1994 Public Use Micro Data Report, which provides files containing 
both person-specific and job-specific information. The SLID sample basically covers the 
population of the ten Canadian provinces, with the exception of residents in institutions, 
those living on Indian Reserves, and Armed Forces personnel living within barracks. The 
sample contains 29,632 observations.  
This study considers only the male sample aged between sixteen and sixty-nine years. 
Our wage sample is restricted to individuals who reported positive annual wages and 
salaries and positive working weeks and hours, and whose main occupation is paid work. 
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That is, self-employed people are not included in the wage equation. Further restriction 
involves valid work history information; we eliminated individuals with no applicable 
years of work experience. Individuals who do not have valid data for mother’s education 
and did not clearly state whether they were native-born or immigrants in 1994 were also 
excluded here. Ultimately, there are a total of 6251 males in the sample and a total of 4470 
males are used in the wage equation. 
 
4.2 Data Description 
 SLID is an attractive data set for this study. Firstly, it contains rich information on 
personal characteristics as well as labour market activity throughout the reference year. 
Secondly, to obtain income information for the year 1994, the income interviews 
conducted by Statistics Canada were deferred until May 1995 so that interviewers could 
speak with individuals when income tax information for 1994 was recent and fresh. Lastly, 
when analyzing the wage equation, instead of relying on potential labour market 
experience (calculated as Age-schooling-6), SLID records each respondent’s work 
experiences (both part-time and full-time) since s/she first started to work full-time (called 
FYFTE: Full-year Full-time Equivalent).  
It must be noted that the SLID survey does contain several drawbacks. The survey 
may have ignored any work experience prior to individuals’ beginning full-time work. Also, 
we would like to have access to a more accurate proxy for innate ability such as the IQ test 
scores used by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and AP, but SLID collects no such information. 
Finally, the reason we use the 1994 micro data file, rather than the most recent one (2000), 
is that the latter does not record parental education which is the measure for natural ability 
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in our study.  
We will emphasize that, in many empirical studies, parents’ education is commonly 
used as a proxy to measure an individual’s ability. Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) and 
Card (1999) point out that there exists a long tradition of using family background 
information, such as mother’s and father’s education, to control for unobserved ability. The 
implication is that parental education will affect the children’s earning performance and 
productivity. Additionally, by using father’s education as an indicator for natural ability, 
AP are able to identify the employer learning phenomenon in the U.S. labour market. 
 Much psychological literature indicates that mothers play a bigger role in the 
development of their children than do the fathers. Lamb (1981) suggests that mothers 
spend more time interacting with their children; even when they work the same amount of 
time outside the household as do their partners. In a more recent study, Lamb (1997) 
explores the interaction between fathers and their developing children. Lamb’s results 
suggest that fathers have at least an indirect impact on the development of their children. 
 According to Leibowitz (1974), mother’s education is significantly related to the 
child’s IQ development, while father’s education is not. This indicates that besides genetic 
factors, time devoted to the child is also an important issue in explaining maternal 
education/child IQ relationship. Therefore, we chose mother’s education as the proxy for 
individuals’ innate ability in this study. 
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4.3 Variable Groupings 
The variable groupings and definitions are given in Table 4.1. A person is defined as a 
labour market participant if he has positive wage and weeks worked in 1994. The natural 
log of the hourly wage rate from all jobs is the variable we wish to explain. The explanatory 
human capital, demographic, and job characteristics variables chosen for this study are 
Years of Schooling, Labour Market Experience, Marital Status, whether a person is 
Immigrant, Region of Residence, Occupation Status,2 Industry, and Firm Size. 
While some independent variables can be retrieved directly from the data files, others 
must be constructed manually. The variables that can be retrieved directly are Hourly Wage 
rate, Age, and Years of Schooling. The average age in our wage sample is 38 years and the 
average hourly wage rate is $17.26. Total Years of Schooling are simply the number of 
years of schooling completed by the person (full-time equivalents) to a maximum of 20. 
Following AP, those with education levels below 8 years are eliminated from this study in 
order to reduce the influence of outliers. 
The indirect independent variables are discussed below. The work experience 
(FYFTE) can also be obtained from the SLID data set. People on average have 17.94 years 
of labour market experience in the wage sample. If further combined with information 
from the years, in which persons first started working full-time and covering the period of 
immigration, we are able to identify both experience outside Canada and experience inside 
Canada. We also include the square of work experience to capture the diminishing returns 
on experience. 
For foreign-born workers, because the information on public use micro data regarding 
                                                 
2 SLID follows the Pineo-Porter-McRoberts socio-economic classification of occupation. 
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the number of Years since Migration is reported as an interval, the middle point of the 
interval was taken. Years since Migration indicates the assimilation effect. The square of 
Years since Migration is included to indicate the diminishing assimilation effect. 
Since the levels of Mother’s Education are grouped into categories, year mapping is 
generated, using the categorical information from the SLID data dictionary. The mean of 
Mother’s Education level is approximately 10 years. 
Next, dummy variables are introduced to separate the groups within each independent 
variable. We chose people with the most common characteristics as our reference group.  
Because we are interested in seeing whether people from other countries suffer wage 
penalty, Non-Immigrants are chosen as the base group. We assign the values 0 to 
Non-Immigrants and 1 to Immigrants. Table 4.1 shows that there are approximately 8% of 
men among employed males in 1994 who identified themselves as a member of the 
immigrant group.  
For Marital Status, there are three dummy variables: Married, SepDivWid, (including 
Separated, Divorced, and Widowed) and Single. The base group is the Single people. 
Finally, for Region of Residence variable, 5 dummy variables (Atlantic, Ontario, Quebec, 
Prairies, and British Columbia) are included. The base group is Ontario. Occupation has 6 
dummy variables, where Non-Skilled Worker is the reference group. For firm level 
controls, we include 14 dummy variables for the Industry and 5 dummy variables for the 
Firm Sizes. The reference groups are Manufacturing and Fewer than 20 employees in the 
firm. 
 
 
 35
Table 4.1 Mean of Variables (Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
 
Variable         Mean or %  
Wages and Salaries (per year) $33,957 (18823) 
Composite Hourly Wage (w) $17.26 (7.84) 
Age 38.53 (10.98) 
Years of Schooling 12.99 (2.84) 
* Years since Migration 1.86 (7.15) 
* Age of Immigration 1.59 (6.33) 
Experience (FYFTE) 17.94 (11.30) 
Years of Canadian Work Experience 17.66 (11.16) 
* Years of Non-Canadian Work Experience 0.27 (1.95) 
Mother’s Education 10.05 (2.67) 
Reference Group: Single (Marital Status) 
Married 74.32% 
Separated, Divorced, and Widowed 6.35% 
Reference Group: Non-Immigrant 
Immigrant 8.01% 
Reference Group : Ontario (Region of Residence)      25.14% 
Atlantic 21.14% 
Quebec  20.09% 
Prairies 24.85% 
British Columbia  8.78% 
Reference Group: Non-Skilled Worker (Occupation)   20.14% 
Management 12.64% 
Professional 15.50% 
Supervisor/ Foreman 6.58% 
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Skilled Worker 22.48% 
Semi-Skilled Worker 22.66% 
Reference Group: Manufacturing (Industry)          23.88% 
Primary 8.86% 
Construction 7.96% 
Transportation / Storage 7.05% 
Communication / Utility 4.61% 
Wholesale 6.20% 
Retail Trade 9.31% 
Finance / Insurance / Real Estate 2.55% 
Business 3.11% 
Government 10.43% 
Educational 6.62% 
Health/ Social Service 2.89% 
Accommodation 2.82% 
Other Services 3.71% 
Reference Group: Fewer than 20 (Firm Size)          22.53% 
20-99 employees 17.09% 
100-499 14.56% 
500-999 8.86% 
1000 and over 36.96% 
* For non-immigrants, the value is zero. 
In general, the base group represents Single and Non-Immigrant individuals. In 
addition, it comprises Non-Skilled workers who work in the Manufacturing Industry and 
are employed by firms that hire fewer than 20 employees. 
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4.4 Econometric Specification 
4.4.1 Sample Selection Bias 
Since it is only for employed males that a market wage rate can be observed, the 
sample is not randomly selected. The estimated result actually captures only the wage 
differences among working people rather than the wage rate individuals could earn if they 
decide to participate in the labour force.  
Fortunately, Heckman (1979) proposes a two-stage estimation procedure to correct 
the sample selectivity bias of the market wage equations. The first step is to estimate a 
Probit model of labour market participation, then create the selection variable. Secondly, 
re-estimate the wage equation with the selection variable as an additional regressor. The 
theoretical concept is as follows: Let Ki be an observed indicator of job market 
participation for each individual of the population and K*i be the difference between 
market wage and reservation wage. Most importantly, we can only infer the sign of K*. 
Therefore, the regression model is: 
Yi = Ln Wi  = Xiβ + υi   is observed only when  Ki = 1. 
where  
Xi is a row vector of various observable characteristics that affect the market wage 
rate and error term υi is assumed to be normally distributed ( N[0, σ2υ] ). 
Selection mechanism is: 
K*i  =  Hi γ + ui
where  
Hi is a row vector of various observable factors that determine the selection into paid 
employment and error term ui is assumed to have standard normal distribution ( N[0, 
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1] ). 
Ki = 1 if K*i  =  Hi γ + ui  > 0 (participate in labour market) 
Ki = 0 if K*i  =  Hi γ + ui  ≤ 0 (not participate in labour market) 
Pr (Ki = 1) = Pr (K*i > 0) = Pr (ui  > - Hi γ) = 1- Pr (ui  ≤ - Hi γ) 
Pr (Ki = 0) = Pr (K*i ≤ 0) = Pr (ui  ≤ - Hi γ) 
In terms of standard normal cumulative distribution function,  
  Φ (- Hi γ) = Pr (ui  ≤ - Hi γ) 
Since the standard normal distribution has a symmetric density function, it implies that 
Pr (Ki = 1) = Pr (K*i > 0) = Pr (ui  > - Hi γ) = 1- Pr (ui  ≤ - Hi γ) 
=Φ ( Hi γ) 
Pr (Ki = 0) = Pr (K*i ≤ 0) = Pr (ui  ≤ - Hi γ) = 1 -Φ ( Hi γ) 
Suppose that υi and ui have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
correlation ρ. Then the wage model that applies to the observations in the sample of 
employed persons can be written as 
E( Yi |Xi,  K*i > 0) = E(Yi |Xi, ui  > - Hi γ) 
= Xiβ + E(υi |ui  > - Hi γ) 
= Xiβ + ρσυλi(Hi γ) = Xiβ + βλλi(Hi γ) 
where 
  βλ is the regression coefficient of λi(Hi γ); 
λi(Hi γ) = ф(Hi γ)/Φ(Hi γ); 
ф (Hi γ) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution; 
and 
Φ (Hi γ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
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distribution. So,  
Yi |Xi, K*i > 0 = E( Yi |Xi,  K*i > 0) + vi
= Xiβ + βλλi(Hi γ) + vi
The OLS regression now produces a consistent estimate of β because we include the 
omitted variable, βλλi(Hi γ) in the estimated wage equation. 
 
4.4.2 Labour Market Participation Model 
 In order to correct the sample selection bias, the concept of the Probit model is 
discussed below. The dependent variable (Ki) is set to be 0 for non-labour market 
participants and 1 for labour market participants. This implies that Ki is used to represent 
the occurrence of an event and can take on only two values. Therefore, instead of using the 
ordinary least square technique (which requires Ki to be continuous), the binary response 
model has to be used here. The simplest estimation is to apply the linear probability model. 
However, the main drawback to this approach is that the fitted probability is not limited to 
lie between 0 and 1. Therefore, the Probit model (which is designed to be more 
sophisticated to the characteristics of the binary dependent variable) is used here. 
 As suggested by Greene (2000), the probability of getting the values 0 and 1 is  
Prob(Ki = 1) = F(γ’ Hi) = ∫
γ' Hi
-∞ ф (t) dt = Φ(γ’ Hi) 
Prob(Ki = 0) = 1- F(γ’ Hi) = 1-Φ(γ’ Hi) 
where  
H is row vector of observable variables, γ is the vector of coefficients which has to be 
estimated, F is a monotonically increasing function which takes a real value that falls 
within 0 and 1, Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
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distribution, and ф(.) is the standard normal density. So the probability model is 
E [K i│Hi] = 0[1- F(γ’ Hi)] + 1[F(γ’ Hi)] = F(γ’ Hi) 
 
 The estimates obtained from the Probit regression can then be used to construct the 
selection variable which is called the Inverse Mills Ratio (λi). We introduce λi into wage 
equations as an additional variable to correct for the bias that may have resulted from 
exclusion of people with zero or negative income. Thus, our wage functions are defined as 
following: 
 
Ln W = βx X +βp p +βz z + βpt (p * t) +βzt (z * t)  
+ Selection variable + υ                                                       (4.1) 
Ln W = βx X +βp p + βI I + βz z +βpt (p * tc) + βIt (I * tc) + βzt (z * tc)  
+ Selection variable + υ              (4.2) 
 
4.4.2.1 Marginal Effect 
 The primary interest is to understand the effect of Hi on the conditional probability. 
Since Φ(γ’ Hi) is not a linear function, the estimated coefficient γ from the Probit model 
does not represent the marginal effect of the H. The actual marginal effect in the probability 
model is calculated by 
 
∂ E [K│H] =   dΦ(γ’ H)  γ= ф(γ’ H) γ              (4.3) 
   ∂ H             d(γ’ H)     
This marginal effect is simply the product of the estimated coefficient and the 
standard normal density function. Because Φ(.) is the strictly increasing cumulative 
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distribution function, the effect of H on E [K│H] depends on the sign of γ. That is, the 
probability of participating in the labour market will increase if the value of γ is positive. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
This study investigates the employer learning phenomenon and statistical 
discrimination in the Canadian labour market. In general, there are two main parallel 
estimations of wage equations. One is specific to test statistical discrimination on the basis 
of education (equation 4.1) and the other is specific to test statistical discrimination on the 
basis of immigration status (equation 4.2).  
The first section in this chapter discusses the results of labour market participation 
decision, which are used to calculate the sample selection correction variable. The second 
section examines the standard controlled variables, which include Experience, Marital 
Status, Region of Residence, Occupation, Industry and Firm Size. In addition, we control 
Year since Migration and its square in the immigration equation. Finally, we present the 
findings on employer learning and whether firms use education to predict the productivity 
of new workers. The results related to immigration status will be presented at the end. 
 
5.1 Empirical Results of Labour Market Participation Equation 
 The regression results of the probability for participating in paid job labour market are 
displayed in Table 5.1.  The labour market participation equation corresponding to 
statistical discrimination on the basis of education is presented under specification A while 
 43
the equation for immigration status is presented under specification B. The marginal effect, 
which is calculated by using (4.3), indicates the effect on the probability of participating in 
the labour market with respect to a change in the explanatory variable. The probability 
densities at the mean for specification A and specification B are 0.2857 and 0.2854 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.1 Marginal Effects of Probit Model of Labour Market 
Participation Decision (t-statistics are presented in parentheses)  
Dependent variable: Participant = 1, otherwise = 0 (6251 observations) 
Variable Name: Specification A Specification B 
Years of Schooling 0.0106 (5.83) 0.0107 (5.85) 
Immigrant   -0.0646 (-1.09) 
Experience 0.0085 (3.61) 0.0083 (3.46) 
Experience Square -0.0001 (-1.20) -0.0001 (-1.06) 
Age -0.0018 (-0.40) -0.0017 (-0.38) 
Age Square -0.0001 (-2.91) -0.0001 (-2.89) 
Years since Migration   0.0078 (1.55) 
Years since Migration Square   -0.0002 (-1.90) 
Married 0.0570 (3.29) 0.0567 (3.27) 
Separated /Divorced/ Widowed 0.0099 (0.39) 0.0100 (0.40) 
Atlantic 0.0606 (3.91) 0.0583 (3.72) 
Quebec  0.0405 (2.59) 0.0383 (2.42) 
Prairies -0.0095 (-0.66) -0.0095 (-0.68) 
British Columbia  -0.0032 (-0.16) -0.0033 (-0.17) 
Family Size -0.0179 (-4.16) -0.0179 (-4.14) 
Non-Labour Income /100 -0.0006 (-11.01) -0.0006 (-11.06) 
Constant 0.2860 (3.50) 0.2847 (3.47) 
S. E. of Regression 0.4045 0.4044 
Log Likelihood -3165.03 -3162.1 
P. D. F at mean 0.2857 0.2854 
- Specifications A and B correspond to equation 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
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Education is one of the fundamental factors in determining market activities. As noted 
in many empirical studies in economics, individuals with higher education levels are more 
likely to engage in the labour market. The results in this study tell a consistent story. The 
estimates reported in Table 5.1 indicate that the signs of Years of Schooling are positive and 
as well as are statistically significant in both specifications. That is, education has a 
positive impact on an individual’s labour market participation probability.  
 Regarding the estimated response probabilities from Experience and Experience 
Square, the respective signs are statistically significant positive and statistically 
insignificant negative in both models. Typically, more working experience provides an 
individual with more incentives to enter the labour market. On the other hand, the negative 
coefficient on Experience Square supports the hypothesis that the marginal propensity of 
participating in the job market diminishes with experience. 
 Age and Age Square are also important determinants relating to labour market 
participation. In this study, we observe negative estimated coefficients on both variables, 
though these are not statistically significant for Age coefficients. The results can be 
interpreted as that while individuals might have the same levels of personal characteristic, 
being older is estimated to reduce the probability of paid work participation. This is 
probably an indication of different health status between young and old people. 
 Many empirical studies have found that immigrant males are more likely to become 
self-employed in the labour market, as compared to non-immigrants. The result for 
Immigrant males in specification B in Table 5.1 displays a negative effect on the 
probability of being a paid worker, relative to the base group (non-immigrants). It 
decreases the probability of paid job market participation by about 6.46%. However, the 
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corresponding t value is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. 
Year since Migration and Year since Migration Square simply capture the change in 
the probability of participation in the paid work labour market as individuals are resident in 
Canada. The signs of these coefficients in the estimated model are positive and negative 
respectively in the last column in Table 5.1. They suggest that the foreign-born immigrants’ 
lengths of stay in Canada increase the probability of entering the labour market because 
immigrants gradually obtain information about the Canadian market, albeit in a decreasing 
rate.    
 Marital Status also has some significance in explaining the probabilities in both 
specifications. Being married increases the probability of paid job employment by 5.7%, as 
compared to that for single individuals. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on 
Separated, Divorced, and Widowed groups appear to be statistically insignificant positive 
which implies that the probability for individuals from those groups to participate in the job 
market is approximately only 1% higher than it is for single men. 
 Ontario is the base group for the Region of Residence variable. In general, our results 
indicate that residing in Atlantic and Quebec increases the probability of becoming paid 
workers by approximately 6% and 4% respectively. The effects are statistically significant. 
In contrast, individuals who live in Prairies and British Columbia are estimated to be less 
likely to participate in the paid job market, though the t-values are statistically 
insignificant. 
 Family Size is shown to be negatively related to labour market participation and is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. An individual who is a member of a 
large family appears to have a lower incentive to participate in the paid work labour market. 
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The estimated marginal effect indicates that he is 1.79% less likely to engage in paid work 
employment. 
 The last factor that we wish to explain is Non-Labour Income. Consistent with 
empirical prediction, the Non-Labour Income demonstrates a statistically significant and 
negative effect on the probability of labour market participation. As each additional 
thousand dollars of Non-Labour Income becomes available, the probability of being a paid 
worker for an individual is shown to decrease by 0.6%. The effect is very modest; therefore, 
we conclude it is not economically very significant. 
 
5.2 The Earnings Function 
Using 1994 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics micro data files, we estimated a 
total of 5 equations to test for statistical discrimination based on the years of education. The 
base equation does not include the interaction terms between Years of Schooling (p), 
Experience (t), and Mother’s Education as explanatory variables. The final specification, 
presented in Table 5.2a, includes interactions between p and t as well as between mother’s 
education and t. Results for alternative specifications with different levels of interaction 
terms are reported in appendix Table A1. Estimates for testing statistical discrimination on 
the basis of immigration status with all interaction terms are presented in Table 5.3a. 
To determine the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, we employ the 
5% level against a two-tailed test. In general, we see immediately that the signs of our 
controlled variables yield no surprises. All equations use Heckman’s model to correct the 
sample selection bias.3 However, the sample selection bias is found to be statistically 
                                                 
3 Please see appendix Table A3 and Table A4 for regression results not correcting for Sample Selection Bias. 
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insignificant in Table 5.2a and Table 5.3a since sample selection correction variable 
(lambda) does not appear to be significantly different from zero in all equations. 
 
5.2.1 Results for the Education-Based Statistical Discrimination Equation 
The estimates on Experience are positive and statistically significant and their squares 
are statistically significant negative related to the wage for all equations. These empirical 
results are consistent with the concavity of the experience earning profile as discussed in 
chapter 3, which suggests that individuals’ wages increase with labour market experience 
at a decreasing rate and reach the highest return at approximately 29 years of experience 
(∂lnW / ∂t = 0.0252 – 0.00088t = 0). 
The literature in labour economics often suggests that married male workers have 
higher earnings than their unmarried counterparts. Statistics Canada (1996) concurs that 
Single paid workers are shown to averagely receive lower wages and salaries than do 
married or separated workers. The estimated coefficients on Married and 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed confirm this hypothesis. 
The coefficients on Region of Residence are consistent with the study conducted by 
Statistics Canada (2000). All estimated coefficients are statistically significant since t 
values are well above 1.96 in absolute value. To interpret the estimates on the dummy 
variable coefficients, we have to remember that the results measure the percentage 
difference in wage relative to base group. For example, a male individual who resided in 
British Columbia is estimated to earn about 7% more than one who lived in Ontario, 
holding levels of other variables fixed. 
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Table 5.2a: OLS Results of Standard Controlled Variables for Earning 
Function; Dependent variable: Logarithm of wage rate, t-values are in 
parentheses 
Explanatory Variables: (5) 
Experience 0.0252 (7.64) 
Experience Square/100 -0.0444 (-10.61) 
Marital Status: Single (Reference Group) 
Married 0.1367 (8.89) 
Separated/Divorced/ Widowed 0.0684 (2.81) 
Region of Residence: Ontario (Reference Group) 
Atlantic -0.1640 (-10.96) 
Quebec  -0.0337 (-2.23) 
Prairies -0.0892 (-6.23) 
British Columbia  0.0702 (3.58) 
Occupation: Unskilled Worker (Reference Group) 
Management 0.3220 (16.58) 
Professional 0.2582 (12.93) 
Supervisor/ Foreman 0.2116 (9.28) 
Skilled Worker 0.1987 (12.49) 
Semi-Skilled Worker 0.0681 (4.37) 
Industry: Manufacturing (Reference Group) 
Primary 0.0779 (3.85) 
Construction 0.0830 (3.89) 
Transportation / Storage -0.0061 (-0.28) 
Communication / Utility 0.0825 (3.22) 
Wholesale -0.0747 (-3.30) 
Retail Trade -0.2352 (-11.93) 
Finance / Insurance / Real Estate -0.0174 (-0.53) 
Business -0.0410 (-1.32) 
Government 0.0163 (0.86) 
Educational 0.0334 (1.35) 
Health/ Social Services -0.0502 (-1.61) 
Accommodation -0.3524 (-11.06) 
Other Services -0.2188 (-7.69) 
Firm size: Fewer than 20 (Reference Group) 
20-99 employees 0.1147 (7.09) 
100-499 0.1575 (9.03) 
500-999 0.1840 (9.03) 
1000 and over 0.2654(18.09) 
Lambda 0.0326 (1.02) 
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The benchmark Occupation chosen in this study is Unskilled Workers. Individuals are 
measured to have lower pay if they are members of this group. On average, people in 
Managerial and Professional occupations show a statistically significant advantage in 
nominal hourly wage rate compared to those in the base group.  
 Almost all industry coefficients are statistically significant, except for those on 
Transportation/Storage, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate, Business, Government, 
Educational Services, and Health/Social services. In sum, male individuals in Primary and 
Construction are subject to earning higher incomes relative to individuals in the 
Manufacturing industry. 
 The dummy variables for Firm Size are very statistically significant and positive. As 
Walter and Todd (1999) suggest, workers who work in larger firms are paid higher wages. 
The base group is firms that employ fewer than 20 employees. Male workers employed in 
firms of 20-99,100-499, 500-999, and 1000 and over employees earn 12%, 16%, 18%, and 
27% more respectively, when other workers’ characteristics are held the same. 
 
5.2.2 Results for the Immigration Status-Based Statistical Discrimination Equation 
 A total of 7 estimate equations have been estimated in this section, where total 
experience is divided into Canadian and non-Canadian Experience. Only the result for 
specification with interactions between Canadian Experience and Years of Schooling, 
Mother’s Education, and Immigration status is presented in Table 5.3a. Results for other 
combinations of interaction terms are presented in the appendix Table A2.  
The positive and negative coefficients on Experience and Experience Square again 
confirm the experience wage profile. More Canadian Experience brings more wage 
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earning. However, it is interesting to see that Experience outside Canada is statistically 
insignificant in explaining the wage for all equations. As stated by Hum and Simpson 
(1999), this implies that only experience obtained in the Canadian labour market plays a 
role in wage differentials. 
Although Year since Migration and its square follow the inverted-U shape as many 
empirical results suggest, these estimates are not very statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficients on Married and Separated/Divorced/Widowed once again 
behave as predicted in past literature. Male workers will earn lower wages in the labour 
market if they are Single. Married groups on average have about a 14% and 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed groups on average have about a 7% wage premiums over 
those who are not married. Both coefficients are statistically significant. 
For Region of Residence, all coefficients are statistically significant negative, except 
for that for British Columbia. Male paid workers who reside in Atlantic suffer the most 
wage disadvantage, which is predicted to be 16% below that of the base group. 
 As was the results in Table 5.2a, the estimates on Occupation dummies in Table 5.3a 
are very statistically significant. Individuals in Management still have the best wage 
opportunities among all occupations. On the other hand, the wage of the Semi-Skilled 
group is found to be 7% higher than the base group. 
Statistics Canada (2004) shows that in 1996 a worker in the primary or 
communication/utility industry had higher earnings, compared to a worker in the 
manufacturing industry. Our results are generally consistent with what Statistics Canada 
suggests. Primary industry workers are predicted to get paid 7.8% higher and 
Communication/Utility industry workers are predicted to earn 8% more than workers in 
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Manufacturing. 
 The coefficients for Firm Size are almost the same as the results in education 
estimation. The evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals’ wage opportunities 
increase as firm sizes increase. The wage opportunity for firms employing 20-99 workers is 
11% more; that for firms employing 1000 or more workers increases to 26% more than the 
base group. The results are all significantly different from zero and positive. 
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Table 5.3a: OLS Results of Standard Controlled Variables for Earning 
Function with Immigration Status Variable; Dependent Variable: Logarithm 
of wage rate, t-values are in parentheses 
Explanatory Variables: (7) 
Experience in Canada 0.0266 (7.83) 
Experience in Canada Square/100 -0.0461 (-10.62) 
Experience outside Canada -0.0038 (-0.45) 
Experience outside Canada Square/100 0.0204 (0.57) 
Year since Migration 0.0031 (0.51) 
Year since Migration Square/100 -0.0042 (-0.36) 
Marital Status: Single (Reference Group) 
Married 0.1417 (9.20) 
Separated/Divorced/ Widowed 0.0732 (3.01) 
Region of Residence: Ontario (Reference Group) 
Atlantic -0.1636 (-10.88) 
Quebec  -0.0345 (-2.26) 
Prairies -0.0877 (-6.12) 
British Columbia  0.0708 (3.61) 
Occupation: Unskilled Worker (Reference Group) 
Management 0.3212 (16.56) 
Professional 0.2542 (12.75) 
Supervisor/ Foreman 0.2106 (9.24) 
Skilled Worker 0.1974 (12.42) 
Semi-Skilled Worker 0.0680 (4.37) 
Industry: Manufacturing (Reference Group) 
Primary 0.0787 (3.89) 
Construction 0.0801 (3.75) 
Transportation / Storage -0.0050 (-0.23) 
Communication / Utility 0.0849 (3.32) 
Wholesale -0.0725 (-3.20) 
Retail Trade -0.2358 (-11.97) 
Finance / Insurance / Real Estate -0.0132 (-0.40) 
Business -0.0356 (-1.15) 
Government 0.0169 (0.89) 
Educational 0.0339 (1.37) 
Health/ Social Services -0.0511 (-1.64) 
Accommodation -0.3498 (-10.99) 
Other Services -0.2161 (-7.61) 
Firm Size: Fewer than 20 (Reference Group) 
20-99 employees 0.1140 (7.06) 
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100-499 0.1581 (9.08) 
500-999 0.1844 (9.06) 
1000 and over 0.2639 (18.01) 
Lambda 0.0368 (1.14) 
 
5.3 Test for Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination on the Basis of 
Education 
 The OLS estimates for Years of Schooling, Mother’s Education, and their interactions 
with Experience (Full-time Full-year Equivalent) are shown in Table 5.2b. Specification (1) 
presents the equation, which includes Years of Schooling only. Other specifications 
provide comparable results by controlling different interaction variables. 
 All of the results in the following table indicate that Years of Schooling has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on individuals’ wages. Looking at the estimated 
coefficients, other things being fixed (marital status, region and so on), they predict a 3% to 
3.6% (∂lnW /∂p) associated returns for another year of education. With the Mother’s 
Education in the equation (specification (2)), the partial effect of Years of Schooling drops 
very slightly from 3.1% to 3%.  
Next, we estimate an equation, which include Years of Schooling and its inter action 
with Experience. In column (3), the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.0178. It implies 
that for each additional year of job market experience the impact of schooling on wages 
only drops by 0.02%. This turns out to be neither statistically significantly different from 
zero nor economically large. 
We control both Mother’s Education and interaction between Years of Schooling and 
Experience in specification (4). The estimate for Mother’s Education is statistically 
significant at the 5% level against a two-tailed test and indicates that the wage of an 
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individual increases by approximately 0.6% when mother’s years of schooling increases by 
another year.  
In general, our results provide evidence on employer learning in the Canadian labour 
market. The evidence comes from the interaction between the hard-to-observe variable 
(measured by Mother’s Education) and job market experience.  
In column (5), the main effect of Mother’s Education is now -0.0045 and becomes 
statistically insignificant when the interaction variable is added. The estimated coefficient 
on Mother’s Education * Experience is positive and statistically significant at 0.0556 
(3.12). On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on Years of Schooling * Experience is 
negative but only nearly significant at -0.0300 (-1.85). That is, we have bpt < 0 and bzt > 0 
which confirm Propositions 1 and 2 as mentioned in chapter 3.  
There is also supportive evidence indicating statistical discrimination on the basis of 
education. The parameter of interest is on the interaction term Years of Schooling * 
Experience: the coefficient measures the decline in education value due to the revelation of 
new information (Mother’s Education) with time, provided we allow that Mother’s 
Education is correlated with Years of Schooling. The coefficient on Years of schooling * 
Experience we obtain from specification (4) and (5) show that the number drops 
from –0.0175 (-1.11) to –0.0300 (-1.85), when controlling the Experience interacted with 
Mother’s Education. 
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Table 5.2b: Earning Function (Table 5.2a continued) 
Effects of Mother’s Education, Years of Schooling, and Interaction Terms 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of wage rate, t-values are in parentheses 
 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Years of Schooling (p) 0.0310 
(13.86) 
0.0301 
(13.27) 
0.0344 
(9.26) 
0.0334 
(8.95) 
0.0355 
(9.38) 
Mother’s Education  0.0055 
(2.64) 
 0.0054 
(2.63) 
-0.0045 
(-1.18) 
Years of Schooling * 
Experience/100 
  -0.0178
(-1.13) 
-0.0175 
(-1.11) 
-0.0300 
(-1.85) 
Mother’s Education * 
Experience/100 
    0.0556 
(3.12) 
Constant 1.7155 
(44.03) 
1.6645 
(38.28) 
1.6706 
(30.01) 
1.6204 
(27.55) 
1.7030 
(26.43) 
R-Squared 0.5017 0.5025 0.5019 0.5027 0.5038 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4981 0.4988 0.4982 0.4988 0.4998 
 
Now, we can turn to test Proposition 3: ∂bpt /∂t = - Φzp * ∂bzt /∂t. According to AP, the 
product of the negative of the coefficient of the regression of Mother’s Education on Years 
of schooling (-cov (p,z)/var(p))4 and the coefficient on Mother’s Education interacted with 
Experience should equal the coefficient on the interaction between Years of Schooling and 
Experience. The result in Table 5.4 shows that this product is –0.0001. The coefficient on 
Years of Schooling * Experience is –0.0003 in column (5), Table 5.2b. Performing the 
coefficient Wald Test, we fail to reject Proposition 3.5 However, the number is not 
economically or practically very large. 
Based on our results, we conclude that employers appear to make hiring decisions 
with very limited information. Early easily observable indicators such as education 
determine initial wages. When learning takes place, the effect of Mother’s Education 
                                                 
4 The regression result is reported in Table A5 in appendix. 
5 Since the estimated equation is a nonlinear equation, we use the chi-square statistic to test proposition 3.  
χ2 1, 95% = 3.84. 
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increases with Experience and, most importantly, the effect of Years of Schooling declines 
substantially with Experience. 
Table 5.4: Wald Test 
Test Statistic: Value Degree of Freedom Probability 
F-statistic 0.956800 (1, 4434) 0.3280 
Chi-square 0.956800 1 0.3280 
 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (=0) Value Standard Error 
Bpt + 0.262413 * bzt -0.000154 0.000157 
 
5.4 Test for Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination on the Basis of 
Immigration Status 
 Table 5.3b reports the estimated wage equation results, which additionally include a 
dichotomous variable for immigration status. As was the case in section 5.2b, the results in 
all specifications provide evidence supporting a positive relationship between Years of 
Schooling and wages. Over time, wages paid to workers are strongly related to 
unobservable ability and less related to easily observable variable (column (5)). 
 After controlling the effects of demographic, occupation, and industry variables, 
Immigrant enters the coefficient of -0.1034 (-1.54). This implies that a person who belongs 
to the immigrant group suffers about 10% wage penalty compared to his/her Canadian 
counterparts. While the t statistics is not statistically significant different from zero at 95% 
of confidence interval, the estimate is considered to be economically significant.  
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When Mother’s Education is added in columns (2) and (4), the results reveal very 
slightly increases on the estimated coefficients of Immigrant, which are -0.0915 and 
-0.0926 respectively (compared to -0.1034).  
In column (6), we add the interaction Immigration * Experience in Canada/10 to the 
equation, its value is 0.0434 (1.33) and the coefficient on Immigrant is now estimated to be 
-0.0859 (-1.27). While both t statistics in the equation are statistically insignificant at 95% 
of confidence interval, the coefficient on Immigrant remains economically large. The result 
suggests that with each additional year of increase in the Canadian labour experience, the 
wage of an immigrant is estimated to increase by about 0.4% which is practically not a big 
change. 
When introducing the interaction variable of Mother’s education and Experience in 
Canada into column (7), the intercept of Immigrant becomes more negative at -0.1028 
(-1.52). On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on Immigrant * Experience in 
Canada/10 becomes more positive at 0.0453 (1.39). This value increases slightly, as 
compared to specification (6). But the results are never statistically significant. One 
possible explanation is that learning about new information enables employers to have 
larger information set to evaluate their employees’ productivity, instead of relying on early 
signals (education and immigration status). However, we wish to point out that employee 
learning can also explain these results. That is, the positive coefficient on Immigrant 
interacted with Canadian labour market experience might partially be due to the fact that as 
immigrants actually get involved in the Canadian labour market, they obtain more practical 
knowledge about the local market. Therefore, their wages will increase with increased 
Canadian experience. 
 58
Table 5.3b: Earning Function (Table 5.3a continued) 
Effects of Mother’s Education, Schooling, Immigration Status, and Interaction 
Terms 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of wage rate, t-values are in parentheses 
 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Years of Schooling 
(p) 
0.0311
(13.86)
0.0302
(12.30)
0.0360
(9.66)
0.0350
(9.36)
0.0371 
(9.75)
0.0351 
(9.39) 
0.0372
(9.79)
Immigrant (I) -0.1034
(-1.54)
-0.0915
(-1.36)
-0.1044
(-1.56)
-0.0926
(-1.38)
-0.1097 
(-1.63) 
-0.0859 
(-1.27) 
-0.1028
(-1.52)
Mother’s 
Education 
 0.0051
(2.44)
 0.0050
(2.42)
-0.0044 
(-1.16) 
0.0051 
(2.45) 
-0.0044
(-1.16)
S* Experience in 
Canada/100 
  -0.0263
(-1.62)
-0.0260
(-1.60)
-0.0381 
(-2.28) 
-0.0268 
(-1.65) 
-0.0390
(-2.34)
ME* Experience 
in Canada/100 
    0.0537 
(2.96)
 0.0542
(2.99)
I* Experience in 
Canada/10 
     0.0434 
(1.33) 
0.0453
(1.39)
Constant 1.7142
(43.96)
1.6668
(38.27)
1.6492
(29.5)
1.6030
(27.16)
1.6814 
(26.01) 
1.6017 
(27.14) 
1.6808
(26.01)
R-Squared 0.5043 0.5049 0.5046 0.5052 0.5062 0.5054 0.5064
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.5001 0.5007 0.5003 0.5009 0.5017 0.5009 0.5018
 
 
. 
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We now turn to test Proposition 3: ∂bpt /∂t = - Φzp  * ∂bzt /∂t and ∂bIt /∂t = - ΦzI  * ∂bzt /∂t, 
where s represents the Years of Schooling and I is Immigration status. To get Φzp and ΦzI, 
we regress Mother’s Education on Years of Schooling and Immigrant.6 For Years of 
Schooling, the interaction product is -0.000145 and the coefficient on Years of Schooling * 
Experience in Canada is -0.000390. For Immigrant, the interaction product is 0.000269 and 
the coefficient on Immigrant * Experience in Canada is 0.00453. In Table 5.5, the Joint 
Wald Test with 2 degrees of freedom fails to reject the proposition that the Immigration 
Status is used for statistical discrimination by employers.7 Because the product values are 
relative small, we conclude that the results are economically not significant. 
 In general, the results only display a weak indication that employers use 
education along with immigration status to statistically discriminate against job applicants 
when their future work performances are uncertain. While both intercept and interaction 
between Immigrant and Canadian Experience appear to be statistically insignificant in the 
model, the coefficient on Immigrant remains economically large throughout. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The regression result is reported in Table A6 in appendix. 
7 χ2 2, 95% = 5.99. 
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Table 5.5: Joint Wald Test 
Test Statistic: Value Degree of Freedom Probability 
F-statistic 1.922587 (2, 4428) 0.1464 
Chi-square 3.845175 2 0.1464 
 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (=0) Value Standard Error 
Bpt + 0.266958 * bzt -0.000246 0.000162 
BIt + (-0.496653) * bzt 0.004257 0.003265 
 
5.5 Summary 
 In general, our empirical results confirm the hypotheses of previous studies. First, the 
signs of estimated coefficients on the demographic and labour market variables behave as 
expected. Using the standard human capital equation, we find strong evidence to support 
employer learning and statistical discrimination on the basis of education in the Canadian 
labour market. Years of Schooling act as a signaling device for employers to predict the 
productivity of potential workers at the beginnings of their careers. The results on Mother’s 
Education interacted with Experience are also consistent with Farber and Gibbons (1996) 
and Altonji and Pierret’s (1998, 2001) results, in which the effects of unobserved ability 
increase with experience. 
 On the other hand, the results do not seem to support statistical discrimination on the 
basis of immigration status. All estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The problems of statistical discrimination have been used to explain unequal pay 
among equally able workers in labour economics for more than thirty years. From the 
standpoint of neoclassical theory, it can be characterized as efficient. In a world of 
imperfect information, it is rational for employers to use limited information to maximize 
profit. An economy with statistical discrimination is therefore said to be more efficient than 
one where employers completely neglect available information. This paper investigates 
whether firms use education and immigration status to infer performance and/or ability in 
Canada within a simple employer learning model, given imperfect observability of 
productivity. 
Throughout this study, it is assumed that the labour market is competitive and that the 
information is symmetric across all employers. We employ the 1994 Public Use Micro 
Data Report of the second wave of Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) in the 
analysis. In addition, the use of Heckman’s sample selection correction technique has been 
applied to estimate the paid workers’ wage equations using the standard human capital 
framework which controls for several worker level and firm-specific variables. 
In accordance with Farber and Gibbons (1996), and Altonji and Pierret’s (1998, 2001) 
studies, the results show that readily available information is a key determinant of initial 
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pay decisions in Canada. We find that in the absence of correct information on the actual 
productivity of new workers, easily observable characteristics such as years of schooling 
and immigration status are often used by profit-maximizing firms to distinguish workers. 
Moreover, evidence on employer learning is also found in this paper. This implies that a 
firm will learn to adjust the initial beliefs, as better information about a worker becomes 
available in the market. 
In the first part of our estimation we analyze a wage equation, which uses years of 
schooling and mother’s education as the indicators of a worker’s general and true 
productivity respectively. Furthermore, both variables interacted with experience are 
included in the equation to capture the learning process. First of all, years of schooling is 
shown to have a statistically significant positive effect on initial wages. Secondly, we are 
able to confirm the hypothesis of statistical discrimination on the basis of education. The 
impact of mother’s education on wage rises with the length of labour market experience. 
And most importantly, the reward to schooling falls with experience. 
  To test whether firms use immigration status as a cheap informational source to 
statistically discriminate among workers, we include immigration status along with years 
of schooling into the wage equation. The negative immigrant intercept is consistent with 
many empirical studies, which suggest that the immigration status is negatively related to 
wages. However, the results are statistically insignificant at the 95% of confidence interval. 
On the other hand, the result on the positive relationship between immigrant and work 
experience when the interaction between mother’s education and Canadian experience is 
added implies that employers gradually learn about the productivity of immigrants and 
adjust their initial assessments. However, we wish to point out that the latter result can also 
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be explained by employee learning. Finally, our findings show that non-Canadian 
experience has a positive, however not statistically significant effect on wages. In general, 
our finding provides only a weak indication of statistical discrimination on the basis of 
immigration status in the Canadian labour market. 
This paper assumes that firms rely on some readily available information to make 
different wage offers, even if workers are equally productive. We must remember that 
when employer learning and statistical discrimination exists in the labour market, any 
policy reform should be evaluated within this context. However, simply enforcing a 
discrimination law to eliminate unequal pay is risky. If workers are in fact different in their 
abilities, the discrimination law will actually produce a negative effect in the market. 
Rational firms may respond to this kind of restriction by hiring less disadvantaged workers 
or by lowering the hiring standards, which just further reduces a minority group’s 
incentives for making useful skill investments. Rather, policymakers should turn the focus 
to the workers’ side. Advocacy of policies that encourage lower productivity workers to 
make themselves more valuable to the employers is necessary.  
If both the work experiences acquired abroad and work experiences obtained in 
Canada have the same quality, our empirical results indicate that different values are 
attached to the qualifications. Therefore, instead of emphasizing the traditional legislation 
that tries to enforce labour market opportunity equality, policy implementation should 
focus on helping employers to recognize the values of foreign human capital.  
 One shortcoming of this study is that it assumes individuals’ experience profiles to be 
independent of education and mother’s education. A more general approach, one that 
accounts for the effects of on-the-job training, can be taken in the future research. 
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Economic theory generally suggests that on-the-job training is often given to more 
educated and able individuals. When this happens, it affects the impact of years of 
schooling and mother’s education on individuals’ wages. 
Another future research area can focus on the relaxation of the assumption that 
information is symmetric across all employers in the market. While outside employers 
usually have access only to the public information about potential employees, current 
employers will generally have increased levels of information about those same workers. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: OLS Results of Standard Controlled Variables for Earning Function 
(Dependent variable: Logarithm of wage rate, t-values are in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.0269 0.0274 0.0296 0.0300 0.0252 Experience (t) 
(-15.99) (-16.18) (-10.17) (-10.30) (-7.64) 
-0.0452 -0.0459 -0.0463 -0.0470 -0.0444t Square/100 
(-11.37) (-11.52) (-11.31) (-11.45) (-10.61)
Marital Status: Single (Reference Group) 
0.1392 0.1414 0.1373 0.1395 0.1367 Married 
(9.12) (9.26) (8.95) (9.09) (8.89) 
0.0726 0.0726 0.0713 0.0714 0.0684 Separated/Divorced/Widowed
(2.98) (2.99) (2.93) (2.93) (2.81) 
Region of Residence: Ontario (Reference Group) 
-0.1642 -0.1631 -0.1639 -0.1627 -0.1640Atlantic 
(-10.97) (-10.89) (-10.94) (-10.87) (-10.96)
-0.0399 -0.0341 -0.0398 -0.0341 -0.0337Quebec  
(-2.66) (-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.25) (-2.23) 
-0.0883 -0.0907 -0.088 -0.0904 -0.0892Prairies 
(-6.17) (-6.33) (-6.14) (-6.31) (-6.23) 
0.0739 0.0692 0.0745 0.0698 0.0702 British Columbia  
(3.78) (3.53) (3.81) (3.56) (3.58) 
Occupation: Unskilled Worker (Reference Group) 
0.3267 0.3225 0.3264 0.3222 0.3220 Management 
(16.85) (16.59) (16.84) (16.57) (16.58) 
0.2623 0.2586 0.2613 0.2576 0.2582 Professional 
(13.16) (12.95) (13.10) (12.89) (12.93) 
0.2154 0.2127 0.2147 0.2121 0.2116 Supervisor/ Foreman 
(9.44) (9.32) (9.41) (9.29) (9.28) 
0.1998 0.1981 0.1993 0.1976 0.1987 Skilled Worker 
(12.55) (12.44) (12.52) (12.41) (12.49) 
0.0685 0.0675 0.0683 0.0674 0.0681 Semi-Skilled Worker 
(4.39) (4.33) (4.38) (4.32) (4.37) 
Industry: Manufacturing (Reference Group) 
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0.0785 0.0784 0.0789 0.0787 0.0779 Primary 
(3.88) (3.87) (3.90) (3.89) (3.85) 
0.0813 0.0833 0.0812 0.0833 0.083 Construction 
(3.80) (3.90) (3.80) (3.90) (3.89) 
-0.0037 -0.0049 -0.0044 -0.0056 -0.0061Transportation / Storage 
(-0.17) (-0.22) (-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.28) 
0.0829 0.0817 0.0828 0.0816 0.0825 Communication / Utility 
(3.23) (3.19) (3.23) (3.18) (3.22) 
-0.0730 -0.0736 -0.0736 -0.0741 -0.0747Wholesale 
(-3.22) (-3.24) (-3.24) (-3.27) (-3.30) 
-0.2363 -0.2366 -0.2362 -0.2365 -0.2352Retail Trade 
(-11.97) (-11.99) (-11.97) (-11.99) (-11.93)
-0.0158 -0.0161 -0.0163 -0.0166 -0.0174Finance / Insurance / Real 
Estate (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.53) 
-0.0404 -0.0419 -0.043 -0.0444 -0.041 Business 
(-1.31) (-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.43) (-1.32) 
0.0169 0.0159 0.0167 0.0158 0.0163 Government 
(0.89) (0.84) (0.89) (0.84) (0.86) 
0.0258 0.0283 0.0286 0.0311 0.0334 Educational 
(1.05) (1.15) (1.16) (1.26) (1.35) 
-0.0479 -0.0494 -0.0487 -0.0502 -0.0502Health/ Social Services 
(-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.56) (-1.61) (-1.61) 
-0.3535 -0.3545 -0.3534 -0.3545 -0.3524Accommodation 
(-11.07) (-11.11) (-11.07) (-11.11) (-11.06)
-0.2183 -0.22 -0.2175 -0.2192 -0.2188Other Services 
(-7.67) (-7.73) (-7.63) (-7.70) (-7.69) 
Firm Size: Fewer than 20 (Reference group) 
0.1152 0.1156 0.1146 0.1149 0.1147 20-99 employees 
(7.11) (7.14) (7.07) (7.09) (7.09) 
0.1582 0.1574 0.1578 0.157 0.1575 100-499 
(9.09) (9.02) (9.03) (8.99) (9.03) 
0.1823 0.1835 0.1816 0.1828 0.184 500-999 
(8.94) (9.00) (8.90) (8.96) (9.03) 
0.2664 0.2656 0.2658 0.265 0.2654 1000 and over 
(18.14) (18.10) (18.09) (18.05) (18.09) 
0.0251 0.034 0.0281 0.0369 0.0326 Lambda 
(0.79) (1.07) (0.88) (1.15) (1.02) 
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Table A2: OLS Results of Standard Controlled Variables for Earning 
Function with Immigration Status Variable (Dependent variable: Logarithm of 
wage rate, t-values are in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Experience in 
Canada (tc) 
0.0270
(15.68)
0.0274
(15.86)
0.0310
(10.33)
0.0313
(10.45)
0.0266 
(7.84) 
0.0314
(10.46)
0.0266
(7.83)
tc Square/100 -0.0464
(-11.34)
0.0470
(-11.47)
-0.0482
(-11.37)
-0.0488
(-11.49)
-0.0461 
(-10.62) 
-0.0488
(-11.49)
-0.0461
(-10.62)
Experience outside 
Canada (tnc) 
0.0007
(0.09)
0.0007
(0.09)
0.0009
(0.12)
0.0010
(0.13)
0.0014 
(0.19) 
-0.0041
(-0.48)
-0.0038
(-0.45)
tnc Square/100 0.0069
(0.20)
0.0059
(0.17)
0.0056
(0.16)
0.0045
(0.13)
0.0033 
(0.10) 
0.0209
(0.58)
0.0204
(0.57)
Year since Migration 
(ysm) 
0.0037
(1.00)
0.0038
(0.90)
0.0035
(0.96)
0.0039
(0.86)
0.0030 
(1.06) 
0.0030
(0.34)
0.0031
(0.51)
ysm Square/100 -0.0046
(-0.21)
-0.0046
(-0.19)
-0.0043
(-0.17)
-0.0048
(-0.12)
-0.0041 
(-0.27) 
-0.0041
(-0.21)
-0.0042
(-0.36)
Marital Status: Single (Reference Group) 
Married 0.1445
(9.45)
0.1462
(9.56)
0.1419
(9.23)
0.1437
(9.34)
0.1411 
(9.17) 
0.1442
(9.38)
0.1417
(9.20)
Separated/ 
Divorced/ Widowed 
0.0765
(3.15)
0.0764
(3.15)
0.0748
(3.08)
0.0747
(3.07)
0.0720 
(2.96) 
0.0758
(3.12)
0.0732
(3.01)
Region of Residence: Ontario (Reference Group) 
Atlantic -0.1642
(-10.91)
-0.1629
(-10.83)
-0.1638
(-10.89)
-0.1625
(-10.80)
-0.1637 
(-10.88) 
-0.1624
(-10.79)
-0.1636
(-10.88)
Quebec -0.0405
(-2.68)
-0.0349
(-2.28)
-0.0403
(-2.67)
-0.0348
(-2.28)
-0.0344 
(-2.26) 
-0.0349
(-2.29)
-0.0345
(-2.26)
Prairies -0.0871
(-6.08)
-0.0893
(-6.23)
-0.0867
(-6.06)
-0.0889
(-6.20)
-0.0877 
(-6.12) 
-0.889
(-6.20)
-0.0877
(-6.12)
British Columbia 0.0741
(3.79)
0.0698
(3.56)
0.0748
(3.83)
0.0705
(3.60)
0.0712 
(3.64) 
0.0701
(3.58)
0.0708
(3.61)
Occupation: Unskilled Worker (Reference Group) 
Management 0.3255
(16.81)
0.3216
(16.57)
0.3252
(16.80)
0.3214
(16.56)
0.3212 
(16.56) 
0.3214
(16.56)
0.3212
(16.56)
Professional 0.2591
(13.02)
0.2557
(12.82)
0.2576
(12.93)
0.2542
(12.73)
0.2547 
(12.77) 
0.2537
(12.71)
0.2542
(12.75)
Supervisor/ 
Foreman 
0.2143
(9.40)
0.2119
(9.23)
0.2135
(9.37)
0.2112
(9.26)
0.2106 
(9.24) 
0.2112
(9.26)
0.2106
(9.24)
Skilled Worker 0.1986
(12.50)
0.1971
(12.40)
0.1979
(12.45)
0.1964
(12.35)
0.1975 
(12.43) 
0.1963
(12.34)
0.1974
(12.42)
Semi-Skilled 
Worker 
0.0686
(4.40)
0.0676
(4.34)
0.0685
(4.40)
0.0676
(4.34)
0.0683 
(4.39) 
0.0673
(4.33)
0.0680
(4.37)
Industry: Manufacturing (Reference Group) 
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Primary 0.0783
(3.87)
0.0783
(3.87)
0.0786
(3.88)
0.0787
(3.89)
0.0782 
(3.87) 
0.0792
(3.91)
0.0787
(3.89)
Construction 0.0782
(3.66)
0.0803
(3.76)
0.0780
(3.65)
0.0801
(3.75)
0.0798 
(3.74) 
0.0803
(3.76)
0.0801
(3.75)
Transportation / 
Storage 
-0.0035
(-0.16)
-0.0044
(-0.20)
-0.0045
(-0.21)
-0.0054
(-0.25)
-0.0057 
(-0.26) 
-0.0048
(-0.22)
-0.0050
(-0.23)
Communication / 
Utility 
0.0841
(3.28)
0.0830
(3.24)
0.0842
(3.29)
0.0832
(3.25)
0.0838 
(3.28) 
0.0842
(3.29)
0.0849
(3.32)
Wholesale -0.0720
(-3.17) 
-0.0723
(-3.19) 
-0.0726
(-3.20) 
-0.0730
(-3.22) 
-0.0734 
(-3.24) 
-0.0721
(-3.18) 
-0.0725
(-3.20) 
Retail Trade -0.2375
(-12.04)
-0.2376
(-12.06)
-0.2374
(-12.04)
-0.2375
(-12.05)
-0.2364 
(-12.00) 
-0.2369
(-12.02)
-0.2358
(-11.97)
Finance / Insurance/ 
Real Estate 
-0.0118
(-0.36)
-0.0120
(-0.36)
-0.0126
(-0.38)
-0.0127
(-0.38)
-0.0137 
(-0.41) 
-0.0122
(-0.37)
-0.0132
(-0.40)
Business -0.0348
(-1.13)
-0.0363
(-1.18)
-0.0385
(-1.24)
-0.0400
(-1.29)
-0.0362 
(-1.17) 
-0.0394
(-1.27)
-0.0356
(-1.15)
Government 0.0152
(0.81)
0.0145
(0.77)
0.0153
(0.81)
0.0146
(0.77)
0.0150 
(0.79) 
0.0164
(0.87)
0.0169
(0.89)
Educational 0.0244
(0.99)
0.0269
(1.09)
0.0288
(1.17)
0.0312
(1.26)
0.0331 
(1.34) 
0.0320
(1.29)
0.0339
(1.37)
Health/ Social 
Services 
-0.0485
(-1.55)
-0.0499
(-1.60)
-0.0496
(-1.59)
-0.0509
(-1.63)
-0.0507 
(-1.63) 
-0.0512
(-1.64)
-0.0511
(-1.64)
Accommodation -0.3503
(-10.99)
-0.3514
(-11.03)
-0.3503
(-10.99)
-0.3514
(-11.03)
-0.3496 
(-10.98) 
-0.3516
(-11.04)
-0.3498
(-10.99)
Other Services -0.2159
(-7.59)
-0.2174
(-7.65)
-0.2149
(-7.56)
-0.2165
(-7.61)
-0.2159 
(-7.60) 
-0.2167
(-7.62)
-0.2161
(-7.61)
Firm size: Fewer than 20 (Reference group) 
20-99 employees 0.1150
(7.11)
0.1153
(7.13)
0.1141
(7.05)
0.1144
(7.08)
0.1141 
(7.06) 
0.1144
(7.07)
0.1140
(7.06)
100-499 0.1592
(9.13)
0.1585
(9.09)
0.1585
(9.09)
0.1578
(9.06)
0.1583 
(9.09) 
0.1577
(9.05)
0.1581
(9.08)
500-999 0.1834
(9.01)
0.1844
(9.06)
0.1824
(8.96)
0.1835
(9.01)
0.1848 
(9.08) 
0.1831
(8.99)
0.1844
(9.06)
1000 and over 0.2647
(18.06)
0.2640
(18.02)
0.2638
(17.99)
0.2632
(17.95)
0.2636 
(17.99) 
0.2634
(17.96)
0.2639
(18.01)
Lambda 0.0288
(0.90)
0.0320
(1.14)
0.0337
(1.05)
0.0413
(1.28)
0.0372 
(1.16) 
0.0409
(1.27)
0.0368
(1.14)
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Table A3: OLS Results of Standard Controlled Variables for Earning Function; 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of wage rate, t-values are in parentheses (Do 
not correct for Sample Selection Bias) 
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Years of Schooling (p) 0.0308 
(13.89) 
0.0298 
(13.24) 
0.0339 
(9.24) 
0.0328 
(8.88) 
0.0350 
(9.33) 
Mother’s Education (ME)  0.0052 
(2.54) 
 0.0052 
(2.52) 
-0.0049 
(-1.29) 
p * t/100   -0.0166 
(-1.06) 
-0.0161 
(-1.02) 
-0.0289 
(-1.78) 
ME * t/100     0.0564 
(3.17) 
t 0.0267 
(16.05) 
0.0271 
(16.22) 
0.0292 
(10.16) 
0.0295 
(10.25) 
0.0246 
(7.57) 
t Square/100 -0.0440 
(-12.00) 
-0.0442 
(-12.06) 
-0.0449 
(-11.92) 
-0.0451 
(-11.98) 
-0.0427 
(-11.12) 
Marital Status: Single (Reference Group) 
Married 0.1387 
(9.10) 
0.1406 
(9.22) 
0.1369 
(8.93) 
0.1389 
(9.05) 
0.1361 
(8.86) 
Separated/ Divorced/ 
Widowed 
0.0728 
(2.99) 
0.0729 
(3.00) 
0.0717 
(2.94) 
0.0718 
(2.95) 
0.0687 
(2.83) 
Region of Residence: Ontario (Reference Group) 
Atlantic -0.1657 
(-11.14) 
-0.1650 
(-11.11) 
-0.1655 
(-11.13) 
-0.1649 
(-11.10) 
-0.1659 
(-11.17) 
Quebec -0.0412 
(-2.76) 
-0.0361 
(-2.40) 
-0.0412 
(-2.77) 
-0.0362 
(-2.41) 
-0.0355 
(-2.37) 
Prairies -0.0881 
(-6.16) 
-0.0904 
(-6.31) 
-0.0878 
(-6.13) 
-0.0901 
(-6.28) 
-0.0889 
(-6.21) 
British Columbia 0.0737 
(3.77) 
0.0691 
(3.52) 
0.0742 
(3.79) 
0.0696 
(3.54) 
0.0700 
(3.57) 
Occupation: Unskilled Worker (Reference Group) 
Management 0.3265 
(16.84) 
0.3224 
(16.58) 
0.3262 
(16.83) 
0.3221 
(16.57) 
0.3220 
(16.58) 
Professional 0.2621 
(13.16) 
0.2585 
(12.95) 
0.2611 
(13.09) 
0.2576 
(12.89) 
0.2582 
(12.93) 
Supervisor/ 
Foreman 
0.2144 
(9.41) 
0.2115 
(9.28) 
0.2137 
(9.37) 
0.2109 
(9.25) 
0.2105 
(9.24) 
Skilled Worker 0.1993 
(12.53) 
0.1975 
(12.41) 
0.1998 
(12.49) 
0.1970 
(12.38) 
0.1982 
(12.46) 
Semi-Skilled Worker 0.0679 
(4.36) 
0.0668 
(4.29) 
0.0677 
(4.35) 
0.0666 
(4.27) 
0.0675 
(4.33) 
Industry: Manufacturing (Reference Group) 
Primary 0.0789 
(3.90) 
0.0788 
(3.90) 
0.0792 
(3.91) 
0.0792 
(3.91) 
0.0783 
(3.87) 
Construction 0.0819 0.0841 0.0820 0.0841 0.0837 
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(3.84) (3.94) (3.84) (3.94) (3.93) 
Transportation / Storage -0.0036 
(-0.17) 
-0.0047 
(-0.22) 
-0.0043 
(-0.20) 
-0.0054 
(-0.25) 
-0.0060 
(-0.28) 
Communication / Utility 0.0828 
(3.23) 
0.0817 
(3.19) 
0.0828 
(3.23) 
0.0816 
(3.18) 
0.0825 
(3.22) 
Wholesale -0.0734 
(-3.24) 
-0.0741 
(-3.27) 
-0.0740 
(-3.26) 
-0.0746 
(-3.29) 
-0.0752 
(-3.32) 
Retail Trade -0.2368 
(-12.00) 
-0.2372 
(-12.03) 
-0.2367 
(-12.00) 
-0.2372 
(-12.03) 
-0.2358 
(-11.97) 
Finance / Insurance / Real 
Estate 
-0.0157 
(-0.47) 
-0.0159 
(-0.48) 
-0.0162 
(-0.49) 
-0.0164 
(-0.49) 
-0.0173 
(-0.52) 
Business -0.0395 
(-1.28) 
-0.0405 
(-1.31) 
-0.0418 
(-1.35) 
-0.0428 
(-1.38) 
-0.0395 
(-1.27) 
Government 0.0175 
(0.92) 
0.0167 
(0.89) 
0.0174 
(0.92) 
0.0167 
(0.88) 
0.0171 
(0.91) 
Educational 0.0265 
(1.08) 
0.0292 
(1.19) 
0.0293 
(1.18) 
0.0319 
(1.29) 
0.0341 
(1.38) 
Health/ Social Services -0.0467 
(-1.50) 
-0.0478 
(-1.53) 
-0.0473 
(-1.52) 
-0.0484 
(-1.55) 
-0.0486 
(-1.56) 
Accommodation -0.3532 
(-11.07) 
-0.3541 
(-11.10) 
-0.3531 
(-11.06) 
-0.3540 
(-11.10) 
-0.3520 
(-11.04) 
Other Services -0.2174 
(-7.64) 
-0.2186 
(-7.69) 
-0.2165 
(-7.61) 
-0.2178 
(-7.65) 
-0.2176 
(-7.66) 
Firm size: Fewer than 20 (Reference group) 
20-99 employees 0.1147 
(7.09) 
0.1149 
(7.10) 
0.1140 
(7.04) 
0.1142 
(7.06) 
0.1141 
(7.05) 
100-499 0.1580 
(9.05) 
0.1571 
(9.01) 
0.1575 
(9.02) 
0.1567 
(8.98) 
0.1573 
(9.02) 
500-999 0.1817 
(8.92) 
0.1827 
(8.97) 
0.1809 
(8.87) 
0.1819 
(8.93) 
0.1833 
(9.00) 
1000 and over 0.2656 
(18.13) 
0.2646 
(18.07) 
0.2650 
(18.07) 
0.2640 
(18.01) 
0.2645 
(18.06) 
Constant 1.7284 
(48.87) 
1.6840 
(42.70) 
1.6878 
(32.39) 
1.6451 
(30.03) 
1.7259 
(28.59) 
R-Squared 0.5017 0.5024 0.5018 0.5025 0.5036 
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Table A4: OLS Results of Standard Controlled Variables for Earning Function 
with Immigration Status Variable; Dependent variable: Logarithm of wage 
rate, t-values are in parentheses (Do not correct for Sample Selection Bias) 
Explanatory 
variables: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Years of Schooling (p) 0.0308
(13.88)
0.0299
(13.26)
0.0353
(9.62)
0.0343
(9.27)
0.0365 
(9.69) 
0.0344
(9.30)
0.0366
(9.72)
Immigrant (I) -0.1007
(-1.50)
-0.0887
(-1.32)
-0.1013
(-1.51)
-0.0894
(-1.33)
-0.1071 
(-1.59) 
-0.0827
(-1.23)
-0.1003
(-1.49)
Mother’s Education 
(ME) 
 0.0048
(2.33)
 0.0048
(2.31)
-0.0048 
(-1.27) 
0.0048
(2.34)
-0.0048
(-1.27)
p * tc /100   -0.0247
(-1.53)
-0.0240
(-1.49)
-0.0365 
(-2.19) 
-0.0249
(-1.54)
-0.0375
(-2.25)
ME * tc /100     0.0546 
(3.01) 
 0.0550
(3.04)
I * tc /10      0.0438
(1.34)
0.0446
(1.40)
tc 0.0267
(15.73)
0.0271
(15.88)
0.0304
(10.30)
0.0307
(10.38)
0.0259 
(7.75) 
0.0307
(10.39)
0.0259
(7.75)
tc Square/100 -0.0450
(-11.89)
-0.0453
(-11.95)
-0.0465
(-11.90)
-0.0466
(-11.95)
-0.0441 
(-11.06) 
-0.0467
(-11.96)
-0.0441
(-11.07)
tnc 0.0010
(0.13)
0.0011
(0.14)
0.0013
(0.17)
0.0014
(0.18)
0.0018 
(0.24) 
-0.0037
(-0.44)
-0.0035
(-0.42)
tnc Square/100 0.0070
(0.21)
0.0060
(0.18)
0.0057
(0.17)
0.0048
(0.14)
0.0035 
(0.10) 
0.0213
(0.59)
0.0207
(0.58)
Year since Migration 
(ysm) 
0.0035
(1.00)
0.0039
(0.87)
0.0033
(0.93)
0.0037
(0.83)
0.0035 
(1.04) 
0.0030
(0.30)
0.0029
(0.48)
ysm Square/100 -0.0045
(-0.21)
-0.0043
(-0.14)
-0.0042
(-0.13)
-0.0049
(-0.07)
-0.0046 
(-0.23) 
-0.0043
(-0.16)
-0.0042
(-0.033)
Marital Status: Single (Reference Group) 
Married 0.1438
(9.42)
0.1454
(9.51)
0.1413
(9.20)
0.1429
(9.30)
0.1404 
(9.13) 
0.1434
(9.33)
0.1409
(9.16)
 Separated/ Divorced/ 
Widowed 
0.0767
(3.16)
0.0766
(3.16)
0.0751
(3.09)
0.0750
(3.09)
0.0723 
(2.98) 
0.0762
(3.13)
0.0735
(3.02)
Region of Residence: Ontario (Reference Group) 
Atlantic -0.1656
(-11.06)
-0.1647
(-11.01)
-0.1654
(-11.05)
-0.1645
(-11.00)
-0.1655 
(-11.07) 
-0.1644
(-10.99)
-0.1654
(-11.06)
Quebec -0.0416
(-2.77)
-0.0366
(-2.41)
-0.0417
(-2.78)
-0.0367
(-2.42)
-0.0362 
(-2.38) 
-0.0368
(-2.43)
-0.0362
(-2.39)
Prairies -0.0868
(-6.07)
-0.0888
(-6.20)
-0.0864
(-6.04)
-0.0884
(-6.17)
-0.0873 
(-6.10) 
-0.884
(-6.17)
-0.0872
(-6.09)
British Columbia 0.0738
(3.78)
0.0696
(3.55)
0.0745
(3.81)
0.0703
(3.59)
0.0710 
(3.63) 
0.0698
(3.56)
0.0706
(3.60)
Occupation: Unskilled Worker (Reference Group) 
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Management 0.3253
(16.80)
0.3216
(16.56)
0.3250
(16.79)
0.3213
(16.55)
0.3211 
(16.56) 
0.3213
(16.55)
0.3211
(16.56)
Professional 0.2589
(13.01)
0.2555
(12.81)
0.2574
(12.92)
0.2542
(12.73)
0.2547 
(12.77) 
0.2537
(12.71)
0.2542
(12.75)
Supervisor/ 
Foreman 
0.2132
(9.37)
0.2107
(9.25)
0.2123
(9.33)
0.2098
(9.21)
0.2094 
(9.20) 
0.2098
(9.21)
0.2094
(9.20)
Skilled Worker 0.1981
(12.47)
0.1964
(12.36)
0.1973
(12.42)
0.1957
(12.31)
0.1969 
(12.40) 
0.1956
(12.31)
0.1968
(12.39)
Semi-Skilled Worker 0.0679
(4.36)
0.0668
(4.30)
0.0677
(4.35)
0.0667
(4.29)
0.0674 
(4.34) 
0.0664
(4.27)
0.0672
(4.33)
Industry: Manufacturing (Reference Group) 
Primary 0.0787
(3.89)
0.0789
(3.90)
0.0792
(3.91)
0.0793
(3.92)
0.0787 
(3.90) 
0.0798
(3.95)
0.0793
(3.92)
Construction 0.0790
(3.70)
0.0812
(3.80)
0.0790
(3.70)
0.0811
(3.80)
0.0808 
(3.79) 
0.0814
(3.81)
0.0810
(3.80)
Transportation / 
Storage 
-0.0033
(-0.15)
-0.0042
(-0.19)
-0.0043
(-0.20)
-0.0051
(-0.24)
-0.0054 
(-0.25) 
-0.0044
(-0.20)
-0.0047
(-0.22)
Communication / 
Utility 
0.0840
(3.28)
0.0830
(3.24)
0.0841
(3.29)
0.0831
(3.25)
0.0838 
(3.28) 
0.0841
(3.28)
0.0848
(3.32)
Wholesale -0.0724
(-3.20)
-0.0729
(-3.22)
-0.0731
(-3.23)
-0.0736
(-3.25)
-0.0740 
(-3.27) 
-0.0726
(-3.21)
-0.0730
(-3.22)
Retail Trade -0.2380
(-12.07)
-0.2383
(-12.09)
-0.2380
(-12.07)
-0.2382
(-12.09)
-0.2371 
(-12.04) 
-0.2377
(-12.06)
-0.2365
(-12.01)
Finance/ Insurance/ 
Real Estate 
-0.0117
(-0.35)
-0.0118
(-0.36)
-0.0124
(-0.38)
-0.0125
(-0.38)
-0.0135 
(-0.41) 
-0.0120
(-0.36)
-0.0130
(-0.39)
Business -0.0338
(-1.09)
-0.0349
(-1.13)
-0.0370
(-1.20)
-0.0381
(-1.23)
-0.0344 
(-1.11) 
-0.0376
(-1.21)
-0.0339
(-1.09)
Government 0.0159
(0.84)
0.0154
(0.81)
0.0161
(0.85)
0.0155
(0.82)
0.0158 
(0.84) 
0.0174
(0.92)
0.0178
(0.94)
Educational 0.0252
(1.03)
0.0278
(1.13)
0.0295
(1.19)
0.0319
(1.26)
0.0338 
(1.37) 
0.0327
(1.32)
0.0346
(1.40)
Health/ Social services -0.0471
(-1.51)
-0.0481
(-1.54)
-0.0479
(-1.54)
-0.0488
(-1.57)
-0.0488 
(-1.57) 
-0.0492
(-1.58)
-0.0492
(-1.58)
Accommodation -0.3499
(-10.98)
-0.3509
(-11.01)
-0.3499
(-10.98)
-0.3509
(-11.01)
-0.3492 
(-10.97) 
-0.3511
(-11.02)
-0.3494
(-10.97)
Other Services -0.2148
(-7.56)
-0.2160
(-7.60)
-0.2137
(-7.52)
-0.2149
(-7.56)
-0.2145 
(-7.56) 
-0.2152
(-7.57)
-0.2147
(-7.57)
Firm size: Fewer than 20 (Reference group) 
20-99 employees 0.1144
(7.08)
0.1146
(7.10)
0.1135
(7.02)
0.1137
(7.04)
0.1135 
(7.03) 
0.1136
(7.03)
0.1134
(7.02)
100-499 0.1589
(9.12)
0.1581
(9.08)
0.1582
(9.08)
0.1575
(9.04)
0.1580 
(9.08) 
0.1573
(9.03)
0.1578
(9.07)
500-999 0.1827
(8.98)
0.1835
(9.02)
0.1816
(8.92)
0.1825
(9.97)
0.1839 
(9.04) 
0.1821
(8.95)
0.1835
(9.02)
1000 and over 0.2639
(18.04)
0.2630
(17.98)
0.2629
(17.96)
0.2620
(17.90)
0.2626 
(17.96) 
0.2623
(17.92)
0.2629
(19.97)
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Constant 1.7289
(48.79)
1.6875
(42.60)
1.6703
(32.01)
1.6310
(29.73)
1.7078 
(28.25) 
1.6294
(29.69)
1.7069
(28.23)
R-Squared 0.5042 0.5048 0.5044 0.5050 0.5060 0.5052 0.5063
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Table A5: OLS Results of Regressing Mother’s Education on Years of 
Schooling 
Dependent Variable: Mother’s Education 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 6242 IF PARTICIPATION=1 
Included observations: 4470 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable: Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Years of Schooling 0.262413 0.013502 19.43525 0
C 6.637402 0.179513 36.97441 0
R-squared 0.077951   Mean dependent var 10.04564
Adjusted R-squared 0.077745   S.D. dependent var 2.671660
S.E. of regression 2.565706  Akaike info criterion 4.722792
Sum squared resid 29412.16     Schwarz criterion 4.725658
Log likelihood -10553.4     F-statistic 377.7288
Durbin-Watson stat 0.155232     Prob(F-statistic) 0
 
 
Table A6: OLS Results of Regressing Mother’s Education on Years of 
Schooling and Immigrant 
Dependent Variable: Mother’s Education 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 6242 IF PARTICIPATION=1 
Included observations: 4470 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable: Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Years of Schooling 0.266958 0.013547 19.70567 0
Immigrant -0.496653 0.141857 -3.501094 0.0005
C 6.618143 0.179372 36.89618 0
R-squared 0.080474   Mean dependent var 10.04564
Adjusted R-squared 0.080062   S.D. dependent var 2.67166
S.E. of regression 2.56248  Akaike info criterion 4.720499
Sum squared resid 29331.67     Schwarz criterion 4.724798
Log likelihood -10547.31     F-statistic 195.4691
Durbin-Watson stat 0.160759     Prob(F-statistic) 0
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